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A Moderation Effect of Safety Climate Variability on the Relationship Between  
Safety Climate Level and Safety Behavior and its Boundary Conditions 
 
Jin Lee, Ph.D. 2014 
Abstract 
This research explored the possibility that the purported relationship between safety climate 
level and safety behavior differs depending on safety climate variability among workgroup 
members. An underlying proposition for this moderation effect is that a large variability in 
safety climate perceptions reflects inadequate human-organization interface design, poor 
team member coordination, and organizational acceptance of unsafe behaviors. In fact, 
empirical studies on organizational climate have already shown that climate variability 
moderates the relationship between organizational climate levels and outcomes. The present 
study utilized 2,043 electrical utility workers from 183 workgroups to examine the 
moderation effect of safety climate variability on the safety climate level and safety behavior 
relationship as well as its potential boundary conditions. The interaction between safety 
climate variability and level was statistically significant while individual and organizational 
characteristics such as employee company tenure, workgroup-level company tenure, task 
independence, and individualistic tasks did not fully explain safety climate variability. In sum, 
the present study provided evidence that safety climate level and variability jointly play an 
important role in the promotion of safe behavior among employees, and that safety climate 
variability is not merely an artifact of individual or organizational conditions. Additionally, it 
was shown that safety climate scale items with more variability tend to have lower means, 
and that they were less predictive of safety behavior. These findings are congruent with 
previous findings regarding an organizational climate level and variability interaction, and 
emphasize the importance of using a multilevel framework for understanding safety climate. 
  
   
Additionally, the study findings underscore the need for conjoint management of safety 
climate level and variability to more effectively promote workplace safety.
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Introduction 
Safety Climate 
Safety climate refers to shared perception of workers about their organization’s 
managerial and operational policies, procedures, and practices in the promotion of safety over 
other competing demands such as productivity (Griffin & Neal, 2000; Zohar, 1980; 2000; 
2011; Zohar & Hofmann, 2012). Based on the theoretical framework for organizational 
climate etiology (Schneider & Reichers, 1983), three approaches of how safety climate can 
emerge within an organization have been proposed (Huang, Robertson, Jeffries, Garabet, 
Murphy, & Lee, 2012; Huang, Zohar, Robertson, Garabet, Lee, & Murphy, 2013a). 
According to the structural approach (Payne & Pugh, 1976), organizational work contexts in 
terms of safety, such as provisions for proper safety training, maintenance of technology and 
systems for safety, and empowerment of safety managers are thought to be the origin of 
employees’ attitudes, values, and perceptions concerning safety. The second is the attraction-
selection-attrition (Schneider, 1987) approach. Organizations that care about safety are likely 
to recruit and select applicants whose values and perspectives on safety are congruent with 
the organizations’. Also, employees who have a high regard for safety are likely to leave 
when their views on safety don’t match with their organizations. The result is an organization 
comprised of employees with fairly strong and homogeneous safety perceptions. The third 
approach involves symbolic interaction (Schneider & Reichers, 1983; Zohar, 2010). It refers 
to employees’ sense-making process regarding safety based on the information from the 
organization’s enacted safety practices. By collecting pieces of information and making 
interpretation of it through social interaction (e.g., verbal communication), employees reach a 
consensus about the organization’s safety-related values and attitudes. 
Characteristics of an organization with a higher level of safety climate include 
steadfast and uncompromising organizational/managerial interest and effort to improve 
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workers’ safety as well as effective and timely interaction between leader and member in 
regard to safety (Zimolong & Elke, 2006). Also, supervisory behavioral integrity, referring to 
the consistency between words and deeds of management, is an integral part of safety climate 
(Zohar, 2011). Safety climate can be promoted with transformational leadership (Bass, 1990; 
1998) or high leader-member exchange (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995) as such types of leadership 
involve high-quality communication between leaders and members through which 
employees’ concerns (including safety related issues) are likely to be addressed. Although 
closely related, leadership is distinct from safety climate. Leadership is more about styles of 
leader-member relationships that can be typically characterized by being passive or active, 
and also proactive or transformative (Bass, 1990), while safety climate is more about 
supervisory or management commitment, particularly directed to employees’ safety (Flin, 
Mearns, O’Connor, & Bryden, 2000; Zohar, 2011). 
Recent meta-analytic studies have shown that safety climate predicts safety outcomes 
such as safety behavior and/or rates of workplace accident/injury (Beus, Payne, Bergman, & 
Arthur Jr., 2010; Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009; Clarke, 2006; Nahrgang, 
Morgeson, & Hofmann, 2011). This is in line with the findings from a large volume of 
previous and recent safety climate research in numerous industry sectors such as the 
manufacturing and mining industries (e.g., Griffin & Neal, 2000), health care industry (e.g., 
Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000), trucking industry (e.g., Huang et al., 2013a), electrical/utility 
industry (e.g., Huang, Zohar, Robertson, Garabet, Murphy, & Lee, 2013b), and construction 
industry (e.g., Siu, Phillips, & Leung, 2004). Some of these studies adopted a prospective 
design and showed that safety climate can predict future safety outcomes such as 
accident/injury rate and injury severity (e.g., Beus et al., 2010; Huang et al., 2013a). Also, 
Zohar and Polachek (in press) adopted a randomized field experimental approach and showed 
that an increase in safety climate level was associated with improvement in safety behavior. 
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Specifically, provision of continuous performance feedback during the 12-week discourse-
based safety climate intervention resulted in improved compliance to safety procedures. As 
such, a close relationship between safety climate level and safety behavior and/or outcomes 
has been widely supported. 
In sum, safety climate is an important indicator of organizational efforts that help 
workers perform safely as individuals or as teams, and it should be carefully considered in 
examination of workplace safety and its improvement. Given this, it is critical to examine the 
mechanisms underlying safety climate such as how it relates to specific safety performance 
and how the relationship can be enhanced (moderation). The focus of the present study is on 
the multi-level aspects of safety climate noting that it is based on organizational members’ 
perceptions (Zohar, 2011; Zohar & Luria, 2005). Specifically, interplay between two different 
aspects of safety climate, level (or quality) and variability, is investigated. Safety climate 
level, oftentimes represented by mean score both at individual- and/or above-individual-
levels, is what safety climate generally refers to in most of extant safety climate research. On 
the other hand, safety climate variability, frequently represented by dispersion statistics like 
standard deviation or consensus statistics like rwg, is a kind of concurrence measure of safety 
climate perceptions among organizational members, thus it always exists at the above-
individual-level. Further conceptual clarification of safety climate variability follows. 
Safety Climate Variability 
One unique feature of safety climate that serves as the bottom-line of safety climate 
variability is a sharedness in workers’ perceptions (Zohar, 1980; 2000; Zohar & Luria, 2004). 
Like other types of organizational climate, such as procedural justice, diversity, ethical, and 
empowerment climate (Schneider, Ehrhart & Macey, 2011), safety climate is based on 
organizational members’ shared perceptions. Operationally, safety climate can be assessed by 
aggregating perceptions of individual workers to the appropriate unit of analysis (Zohar, 
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2011). To form an above-individual-level (e.g., work group-, department-, or organization-
level) safety climate construct as it is originally conceptualized, within-group agreement in 
safety climate perceptions is critical (Klein, Conn, Smith, & Sorra, 2001; Kozlowski & Klein, 
2000). Lack of within-group agreement in safety climate cannot justify the aggregation of 
lower-level (e.g., individual) safety climate perception to create a higher-level (e.g., 
workgroup) safety climate variable because the aggregated score of sum or mean cannot be a 
good representation of the wide range of group members’ perceptions (Bliese, 2000; 
LeBreton & Senter 2008; Schneider et al., 2011). Moreover, Schneider and Reichers (1983) 
argued that shared perceptions serve as an institutionalized social norm that affects worker 
behavior. Specifically, it is expected that workers at an organization with strongly shared 
safety climate perceptions tend to perform in accordance with the overall organization’s 
safety climate level to conform to the social norms for safety in their work organization. 
These independent studies suggest the importance of shared safety climate perceptions in 
terms of statistical justification for the notion of safety climate as an upper-individual-level 
construct, and the need for an optimal level of agreement in safety climate perceptions of 
within-group members for the promotion of their safety behavior and outcomes.  
In fact, perfectly shared perceptions, in other words perceptions with complete 
consensus within group or organization members, are unlikely in the real world (Dickson, 
Resick, & Hanges, 2006) due to numerous organizational and individual factors. Specifically, 
various organizational aspects such as size, hierarchy (Lindell & Whitney, 1995), leadership 
quality, role definition and role stress, characteristics of within-workgroup interaction, and 
job attributes (James & James, 1989; James, James, & Ashe, 1990) influence organizational 
climate. Considering multidimensional structure of an organization, these kinds of 
organizational characteristics may substantially vary within an organization (e.g., by 
hierarchy, sectors, locations) and climate perceptions of workers can subsequently be 
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heterogeneous. Additionally, individual differences in values and attitudes that might affect 
climate perception have been well received by the theories of organizational climate 
development, such as the attraction-selection-attrition process (Schneider, 1987) and 
organizational socialization (Moreland & Levine, 1990). As organizational climate is an 
emerging property (Glick, 1988; Ostroff, Kinicki, & Muhammad, 2012) with workers 
continuously coming in and going out of the workforce, the chance of heterogeneous climate 
perception among workers always exists. For example, the same level of organizational 
safety effort in terms of time and budget may be viewed differently among workers 
depending on how efficiently the effort is carried out by supervisors, duration and quality of 
employee-supervisor relationship, types of jobs (e.g., handling hazardous materials, heavy 
lifting, operating complex systems), job characteristics (e.g., job challenge, job autonomy, job 
importance), role ambiguity/conflict, and so on. Also, safety training programs provided by 
the organization may not be viewed as equally effective across workers with different value, 
attitude, experience, knowledge, and skill sets. Feasibility, acceptability, and appropriateness 
of the training program as well as applicability and sustainability of the training program’s 
impact can vary largely across these properties. Moreover, inconsistent safety 
practices/policies (e.g., over time, across contexts, by supervisors) or complicated safety 
messages from management (e.g., of conflicting values, being nonspecific and unclear) might 
serve as ambiguous cues for organizational safety standards, and subsequently employees 
may develop incongruent safety climate perceptions. In sum, there can be substantial 
deviation in workers’ safety climate perceptions due to a number of factors inherent in a 
complex and dynamic organization as they all serve as “discretionary stimuli” for 
organizational climate (Hackman, 1992). 
Lindell and Brandt (2000) referred the variance of climate perceptions as climate 
consensus while Schneider, Salvaggio, and Subirats (2002) called it climate strength which is 
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borrowed from literature on organizational culture (Martin, 1992; Trice & Beyer, 1993). In 
fact, the term climate strength has been widely accepted in numerous organizational climate 
studies (e.g., Colquitt, Noe, & Jackson, 2002; Dickson et al., 2006; Gonzalez-Roma, Peiro, & 
Tordera, 2002; Zohar, 2011; Zohar & Luria, 2005) though it is also recognized that the 
climate strength is about consensus or deviations in organizational members’ climate 
perceptions. In the present study, the term climate variability will be preferred over climate 
consensus and climate strength for the following two reasons. First, compared to climate 
consensus or strength, climate variability is conceptually more in line with the dispersion 
model (Chan, 1998) and the dispersion composition model (Cole, Bedeian, Hirshfeld, & 
Vogel, 2011) on which the current study is based.  
Within these multi-level analytic frameworks, a focal above-individual-level construct 
is the variance of individual members’ perceptions, and this notion is more clearly 
represented by ‘variability’ than ‘consensus’ or ‘strength’ in terms of direction. Second, the 
term climate strength may pose difficulty in interpretation of what stronger climate means. In 
other words, “climate strength” does not explicitly denote that climate is a collective concept, 
and this term can also be easily confused with climate quality or climate level.  
Safety Climate Variability Measurement 
The present study operationalized safety climate variability as standard deviation 
(SDx) of the within-workgroup members’ safety climate perceptions. SDx, which is the square 
root of the average of the squared differences from the mean, is a measure of disagreement 
unlike another potential measure of climate variability, the rwg index (James, Demaree, & 
Wolf, 1984) which indicates chance agreement-adjusted inter-rater reliability. The difference 
between SDx and rwg can be notable when they are used as consensus indicator for a single-
group, or when the number of groups or organizations to compare is small (Lindell & Brandt, 
2000). However, what these two measures indicate become very similar when the number of 
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response categories for the target climate perceptions is equal by using the same response 
scale across groups or organizations because adjustment for chance agreement will be 
constant (James et al., 1984). In this case, rwg will be perfectly correlated in the negative 
direction with the variance statistic, which is equal to the square of SDx. Thus, use of rwg or 
SDx as a climate variability measure would return the same bivariate relationships between 
the climate variability and climate antecedents or outcomes. Also, a concern when using rwg 
as a climate strength measure has been raised as its calculation of chance agreement is based 
on uniformly distributed (rectangular-shaped) responses that might overlook the possibility 
that respondents give random ratings only in a particular response range (Bliese, 2000). 
Additionally, rwg statistic may have values greater than one, possibly due to an overestimation 
of the degree of agreement, and these values are difficult to interpret (Zohar & Luria, 2005). 
For these methodological reasons, SDx has been widely accepted as a climate variability 
measure in numerous studies (e.g., Dickson et al., 2006; Schneider et al., 2002; Sowinski, 
Fortmann, & Lezotte, 2008; Zohar & Luria, 2005). Furthermore, SDx is preferred over rwg 
because it is easier to calculate and its meaning is more straightforward to most people. This 
practicality issue is important from translation and dissemination standpoints. If safety 
climate variability is shown to play important roles in promotion of workplace safety and 
health, it needs to be kept track of carefully and taken into account for safety management 
and intervention. To facilitate the broader consideration of safety climate variability, having a 
simpler measure of safety climate variability would be more advantageous.  
Organizational Climate Level and Variability Interaction 
Even before the notion of climate variability or strength was well-formulated, 
potentially different effects of homogeneous/heterogeneous organizational climate 
perceptions among organizational members on climate outcome had been suggested. For 
example, in discussion of the impact of organizational culture/climate on organizational goal 
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achievement, Kopelman, Brief, and Guzzo (1990) stated the following: “Tasks for which 
goals are set, rules and procedures formulated, rewards allocated, and support given are ones 
that signal to employees what is expected of them. Clearly, the message carried by these 
signals would be more influential in directing effort to the degree the signals are consistent. 
(...) Without consistency, managers may release opposing forces that cause the organization 
to vacillate rather than to move forward with unity of effort. And, if such unity can be 
achieved, the goals of the organization might be advanced further by the resultant 
organizational syntality (p. 307).” The term “syntality” is a combination of the words 
“synchronization” and “vitality”.  
According to this paragraph, ‘consistent’ climate can signal straightforward directions 
on organizational goals to members. The ‘consistency’ of climate in this context is directly 
related to the degree to which the climate perceptions are shared among organizational 
members and it is conceptually very similar to what climate variability indicates (in the 
opposite direction). Also, it is suggested that smaller climate variability is more likely to 
induce desired climate outcomes, hinting the possibility of main and interaction effects of 
climate variability on climate outcome.  
Similarly, Lindell and Brandt (2000) inferred that climate variability (consensus) 
would moderate the relationship between average climate level (i.e., climate quality) and 
intended climate outcome such that the relationship would be stronger when climate 
variability is smaller (stronger climate consensus). In line with Hackman (1992) and Zander, 
(1994), Lindell and Brandt hypothesized that interpersonal conflict regarding role expectation, 
subsequent poor coordination among workers, and inefficiency in organizational resource 
allocation are associated with higher organizational climate variability. However, this 
inference was not empirically supported. Variability in organizational climate for general 
performance was assessed among 180 chairs of the local emergency planning committees 
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across numerous aspects of leadership, teamwork, role expectation, and job characteristics. 
Only small portion (15%) of them was statistically significantly correlated with climate 
outcome measures in terms of effort, attendance, job satisfaction, citizenship, and turnover 
intention. Also, introduction of the climate variability, as well as its interaction term with 
climate quality, to the regression model in prediction of climate outcomes respectively 
yielded only .017 and .008 of R
2
 increment on average over climate quality. Regardless of 
these findings, Lindell and Brandt did not rule out the potential impact of climate variability 
and offered two explanations for the failure to find meaningful main and interaction effects of 
climate variability on organizational outcomes. First, the effect of climate variability may 
exist only for the organizations or groups where members and job demands are highly 
interdependent. This deliberation has an important implication about boundary conditions for 
a climate variability and quality interaction. It might be organizational structure such as 
hierarchy (e.g., Blau, 1972) and workgroup size (e.g., Goodmna, Ravline, & Schminke, 1987), 
intra and interpersonal characteristics such as tenure (e.g., Rollag, 2004) and socialization 
procedures (e.g., Feldman, 1981), types of tasks (e.g., Neuman & Wright, 1999), and so on 
that determine interdependence of an organizational system. Thus these factors need to be 
considered in examination of a climate variability and quality interaction. Second, the effect 
of climate variability as well as climate quality may be so crucial that organizations with high 
climate variability or low climate quality cannot function and endure, and could not be 
included in a research study. From this standpoint, Lindell and Brandt called for the 
application of a longitudinal framework to investigate the dynamics of climate 
quality/variability and climate outcome relationships. 
Schneider et al. (2002) also hypothesized climate variability (i.e., strength) would 
moderate the climate quality and outcome relationship such that low climate variability 
would enhance the relationship. They treated climate variability as situational strength 
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(Mischel, 1976; Ostroff & Bowen, 2000). According to Mischel (1976), perceptual consensus, 
homogeneous expectations for desired behavior, and consistent pursuit of such behavior are 
expected from a “strong situation”. On the contrary, behavior would be determined mostly by 
individual differences in a “weak situation” as it delivers inconsistent and ambiguous cues for 
expected behavior. By utilizing bank worker (n = 2,134) and customer data (n phase 1 = 3,100, 
n phase 2 = 1,900) obtained from 118 bank branches, Schneider et al. were able to find 
significant interaction between climate quality and variability in prediction of customer 
perceptions of service quality. Specifically, when service climate quality and variability as 
well as their interaction term were introduced to the hierarchical regression models to predict 
each of the four different facets of customers’ service quality perception (i.e., efficiency, 
security, competency, and relationships) that were cross-sectionally measured, the interaction 
term resulted in .13 - .24 increment of R
2
, and they were all statistically significant (p < .01). 
When climate variability is low, indicating higher consensus among organizational members 
on service climate (i.e., stronger climate), the effect of service climate quality on customer 
perceived service quality tended to be stronger, as hypothesized. Similar findings were 
observed for the prospective dependent variables (i.e., the service quality reports from 
customers that were obtained three years later the service climate survey implementation).  
Empirical support for the moderating effect of climate variability on climate quality – 
outcome relationship has been offered by several other studies. For example, by utilizing 88 
manufacturing teams of 1,747 workers, Colquitt et al. (2002) showed that the relationship 
between the quality of procedural justice climate and team performance/absenteeism was 
significantly moderated by climate variability. With the 197 work units of a regional public 
health service and 932 employees, Gonzalez-Roma et al. (2002) revealed that climate 
variability can moderate the relationship between the goals orientation and innovation climate, 
and climate outcomes like work satisfaction and organizational commitment. Additionally, 
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Sowinski et al. (2008) detected a significant moderation effect of climate variability on the 
service climate – turnover/profitability relationship based on the sample of 756 workers 
from129 automotive service stores. Across all of these studies, smaller climate variability 
enhanced the climate quality and outcome relationship, which concurs with Schneider et al.’s 
(2002) findings.  
In regard to the deliberation of the role of climate variability and findings described 
above, Dickson et al.’s (2006) statement as follow may be a good summary: “In organizations 
with stronger climate (i.e., less variability), consensus among members regarding how the 
organization operates ultimately enhances the relationship between climate level and 
outcomes by leading to greater consistency and continuity of member behavior (p. 353).”  
Unlike the prevailing view that variability compromises systems behavior stability 
(Smith, Henning, Wade, & Fisher, 2014), researchers like Harbourne and Stergiou (2009) and 
Karwowski (2012) deemed that variability can contribute to effective system behavior control, 
given that it allows multiple degrees of freedom and flexibility to adapt to environmental 
variations. In fact, the state of perfect consensus in organizational climate may be less than 
ideal because it is very fragile and susceptible to being negated by even a minor breach of 
consensus. Nevertheless, the combined processes of improving climate level and alleviating 
climate variability in order to reduce situational ambiguity in behavioral expectation can be 
generally effective in promoting target outcomes. 
Safety Climate Level and Variability Interaction  
Likewise, safety climate variability (safety climate strength) can moderate the 
relationship between the level of safety climate and safety behavior/outcomes for the 
following potential reasons. First, from the macroergonomic standpoint, higher safety climate 
variability may reflect poor human-organization interface design (Hendrick, 1997; Hendrick, 
2000; Hendrick & Kleiner, 2002; Robertson, 2001). Given that every worker in an 
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organization has different experience, skill, knowledge, perceptual and cognitive style, role 
expectation, preference in interpersonal relationship, etc., organizational safety efforts should 
be made via adjustable and diverse routes to accommodate different needs for safety across 
individual workers. If not, organizational safety efforts cannot be efficiently accessed to or 
accepted by individual workers. For instance, safety training programs or safety policies that 
are designed and implemented without considering heterogeneous safety climate perceptions 
across workers, average level of safety climate perception could be enhanced in general but 
the practical impact of the programs or policies can still be suboptimal due to different levels 
of employee motivation, participation, commitment, and satisfaction that can be influenced 
by perceptions of safety climate.  
A second way that safety climate variability moderates the safety climate level and 
safety behavior/outcomes relationship is that higher safety climate variability can negatively 
affect coordination among workgroup members, which is critical for safety performance in 
many work contexts. If there is a lack of consensus in safety climate perceptions among 
workers who work together as a team, safety is likely to be compromised due to 
miscommunication during interdependent task activities. This mechanism can be understood 
within the framework of shared mental model (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993; 
Klimoski & Mohamed, 1994; Stout, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1996). Mental models help 
organizational members to understand organizational goals, functioning, and expected future 
outcomes (Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers 2000; Rouse & Morris, 
1986). Thus, individual workers’ safety climate perception by and large corresponds to a facet 
of their mental models for workplace safety (Prussia, Brown, & Willis, 2003) because safety 
climate is depending on organizational value, attitude, and practice in pursuit of safety. Large 
variability in safety climate indicates that workers have different mental models about safety, 
and this can lead to ineffectiveness in team processes such as planning and coordination, 
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cooperation, and communication (Mathieu et al., 2000). In this regard, Wahr, Prager, 
Abernathy, Martinez, Salas, Seifert et al. (2013) stated that “teams lacking in shared 
understanding (e.g., shared mental model) have reduced coordination, which leads to poor 
performance” (p. 1143).  
A third way that the safety climate level and safety behavior/outcomes relationship 
can be moderated by safety climate variability is that, higher safety climate variability can 
signal organizational acceptability of safety compromising behavior. Consequently, workers 
are more likely to act like other workers who behave less safely than act like workers who 
behave more safely whenever safety climate is ambiguous and large safety climate variability 
exists within a group or organization. Specifically, when safety climate variability is high, 
workers are unclear about how to perform safely. Under such uncertainty situation, they 
begin to look for behavioral reference and would refer to the most available safety- related 
behavior of their co-workers or supervisors. In fact, perceptions of individuals heavily rely on 
information that is the most accessible, and the impact of accessible information on one’s 
perception outweighs the credibility (Johnson, 1997) and quality (Choo & Auster, 1993) of 
perceived information. This suggests that people tend to perceive something based on 
accessible information although the information is from an unfaithful source and poor in 
quality (Rice & Shook, 1990). The accessible information may serve as a perceptual and 
psychological anchor, and this process is analogous to application of availability heuristics 
under uncertainty (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; 1974). In observation of the wide variety of 
organizational behavior from being highly attentive to being indifferent to safety, workers are 
likely to take shortcuts, and cutting corners with safety. This is because it generally requires 
more effort to perform safely, and people tend to behave in a way to preserve as many 
resources as possible (Fiske & Taylor; 1991; Maddux & Snyder, 1997). The theory of limited 
cognitive capacity supports this idea (Hirst, Spelke, Reaves, Caharack, & Neisser, 1980; 
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Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). For example, an asphalt paving worker can be confusing when 
seeing different levels of safety expectations and efforts of other team members. The worker 
may be able to observe ‘safe’ team members who are vigilant to safety policies and keep 
wearing personal protective equipments (PPE) such as gloves, goggles, and masks. However, 
if there are other ‘unsafe’ team members who ignore safety rules, the likelihood is higher for 
the worker to model after them, because extra physical and cognitive effort required by safety 
procedures such as enduring higher temperature when wearing PPEs (particularly in summer) 
and slower work speed due to paying constant attention to safety rules (Murphy, Robertson, 
& Huang, 2012).  
If the role of safety climate variability as a moderator in determining the safety 
climate level and safety behavior/outcome relationship can be shown to exist, a number of 
theoretical and practical implications are suggested. First of all, this would again support the 
dominant view for the impact of any organizational climate variability on the climate level 
and behavior relationship (e.g., Gonzalez-Roma et al., 2002; Lindell & Brandt, 2000; 
Schneider et al., 2002). This would also emphasize the importance of adopting a multi-level 
framework for safety climate research because safety climate variability necessarily exists at 
the group- or organization-level (Zohar, 1980; 2000; 20011). Antecedents and consequences 
of the safety climate variability can therefore be examined in future studies to extend prior 
safety climate research. Extant research on safety climate has focused mostly on safety 
climate level (quality) than on safety climate variability. Additionally, studies of safety 
climate interventions would be advised to take into account not only the overall level of 
safety climate but also safety climate variability to optimize the impact of safety climate in 
the promotion of safety. Detection of large safety climate variability itself would be 
meaningful because this informs the possibility of suboptimal consequences of even high 
levels of safety climate. Moreover, interventions may be able to be designed to reduce the 
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variability in safety climate perceptions among workers through better or more tailored 
communication strategies, training, or work system design.  
However, unlike other organizational climate domains such as procedural justice 
climate and service climate, there is currently no empirical study directly showing the 
moderation effect of safety climate variability on the relationship between the level of safety 
climate and safety behavior/outcomes (Beus et al., 2010). In one study of Zohar and Luria 
(2004), moderation effect of safety climate variability on the relationship between safety 
climate level and safety outcome was examined with 2,024 infantry soldiers in 81 platoons. 
However, after controlling for the risk level of operational duties, only the main effect of 
safety climate level in the prediction of behavior-dependent injury rate during the six month 
period from the questionnaire completion was advocated while the moderation effect of 
safety climate variability was not supported.  
To address this gap in the literature, the primary goal of the present study is to 
examine whether the safety climate level and safety behavior relationship varies depending 
on safety climate variability. The following hypothesis is proposed (Figure 1-A provides a 
graphical illustration of Hypotheses 1). 
 
Hypothesis 1. The safety climate level and safety behavior relationship will be stronger when 
safety climate variability is smaller (two-way interaction).  
 
Safety Climate in Utility/Electrical Industry 
 The present study utilized workers from two large size electrical utilities in United 
States. According to Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS, 2012a, b) and National Institute of 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH, 2013), there are high risks of injuries and fatalities 
in the electrical utility industry. Specifically, 22 fatal injuries (BLS, 2012a) and 13,000 non-
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fatal injuries (BLS, 2012b) were reported in 2012 only. Between 2003 and 2006, fatal injuries 
totaled 225 which resulted in the cost of $281,000,000 (NIOSH, 2013). Utility/electrical 
workers face numerous types of challenges (Kelsh, Lu, Ramachandran, Jesser, Fordyce, & 
Yager, 2004). For example, they are frequently exposed to hazardous (e.g., contact with high-
voltage electricity and working at elevated/underground stations) and unpredictable work 
environments (e.g., emergency work in harsh weather conditions), and physically demanding 
tasks (e.g., pole climbing and use of heavy equipment). Also, some utility/electrical workers’ 
jobs involve extensive travel and driving. According to Kelsh et al.’s (2004) investigation on 
approximately 530,000 electric utility employees from 12 companies, the 10 most frequent 
injuries between 1995 and 2002 are sprain/strain (36.7%), cut/laceration/puncture (17.8%), 
contusion/bruise (9.9%), other injury, not elsewhere classified (7.1%), fracture/dislocation 
(6.3%), burn from heat/thermal contact (1.6%), electric shock/electrocution (1.4%), 
inflammation of joints (1.4%), hernia/rupture (.5%), and burn from other than heat/thermal 
contact (.5%). Reflecting the complex nature of the utility/electrical industry, many different 
job types are present such as meter readers, line workers, and electricians. Depending on the 
characteristics of the primary job and contingent working environment, workers are exposed 
to different types and frequencies of hazards. As a result, workers with different jobs 
experience different types and rates of injury. For example, between 1995 and 2002, the top 
five injury rate job classifications were meter readers, welders, line workers, drivers, and 
mechanics (Kelsh et al., 2004). For these job categories, injury rates per 100 employees 
ranged from 3.88 to 9.63. Some types of common injury were specific to particular job 
categories (e.g., animal/insect bite for meter readers and scratch/abrasion for welders) while 
others were more general (e.g., sprain/strain). 
A large portion of electrical utility employees work without in-person supervision 
(Barsness, Diekmann, & Seidel, 2005; Kurland & Bailey, 1999). This type of worker is also 
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more likely to experience greater safety risks in the face of hazardous situations such as 
inclement weather conditions and equipment failure (Health and Safety Executive, 2009). 
Unlike non-remote working conditions, remote workers have to handle these safety issues 
mostly on their own with only limited access to timely assistance from supervisors or co-
workers. Thus, safety climate may partly compensate for possibly weaker impact of 
supervisory safety support for this remote worker population who are at higher risk of injury 
or fatality (Huang et al., 2013a; Huang, et al., 2013b). Although remote workers may not 
interact with their supervisors or co-workers as much as traditional in-house workers, 
managerial practice and supervisory care for employee safety could help these remote 
workers to develop a general sense of safety expectation. Specifically, if the remote workers’ 
safety concerns are carefully considered by their supervisors, if their safety behavior such as 
proper use and maintenance of safety equipment is consistently encouraged, and if 
supervisors do not pressure them to sacrifice any safety procedures even when they fall 
behind the work schedule, the remote workers are more likely to perceive greater sense of 
safety support from their management. In this way, a good safety climate can emerge even for 
remote workers. Previous studies provide consistent findings that dimensions of safety 
climate for lone/remote workers are closely related to management's commitment to safety 
(Huang et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2013a; Huang et al., 2013b) in support of this inference. 
Furthermore, Stout et al. (1996) pointed out that a shared mental model will be more 
important when particular work contexts (e.g., overwhelming workload, time pressure, 
independent tasks) restrict communication among organizational members. Under such 
conditions of the reduced communication opportunity, team members are not able to engage 
in the discussion on their next moves and they have to turn to pre-existing knowledge 
regarding task demands and their potential impact on team and teammates (Mathieu et al., 
2000). Hence, the role of safety climate in promotion of safety behavior becomes remarkably 
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important for remote-working utility/electrical workers as it can serve as a mental model of 
workplace safety (Prussia et al., 2003). 
Given this, examination of the possible mechanisms of safety climate level and 
safety climate variability in the prediction of safety behavior would provide practical 
implications for achieving safer working environment in the utility/electrical industry.  
Boundary Conditions of the Moderation Effect of Safety Climate Variability on the 
Safety Climate Level and Safety Behavior Relationship 
 The hypothesized moderation effect of safety climate variability on the safety climate 
level and safety behavior relationship may be present in particular situations only, or it may 
be less marked in particular conditions because numerous organizational and individual 
factors that are known to be systematically associated with safety climate level and variability. 
Understanding under which conditions safety climate variability particularly enhances or 
impairs the safety climate level and safety behavior relationship is therefore important. A 
more sophisticated understanding of the mechanisms of how safety climate level and safety 
climate variability work jointly to promote safety behavior is then worth examining. Also, if 
certain conditions are identified under which the moderation effect of safety climate 
variability is weaker, safety climate interventions aimed at improving safety climate level and 
addressing safety climate perception gaps among group members could then be implemented.  
 Moreover, a potentially unique moderation effect of safety climate variability beyond 
other organizational and individual factors needs to be examined to rule out the possibility 
that the safety climate variability is merely an artifact or surrogate of organizational and 
individual factors. If the moderation effect of safety climate variability on the safety climate 
level and safety behavior relationship diminishes as other organizational or individual factors 
are introduced to the moderation equation, this would provide evidence that safety climate 
variability is of less importance than the organizational and individual contexts.  
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 Beus, Bergman, and Payne (2010) showed that worksite mean tenure was 
significantly and negatively associated with safety climate variability. According to the 
authors, this could be due to socialization processes and attraction-selection-attrition 
procedures. In other words, with more chances to observe organizational safety efforts and 
interact with others, organizational members are more likely to develop assimilated safety 
climate perceptions which in turn lead to smaller safety climate variability. Also, as an 
organization goes through a series of processes of recruiting, selecting, and retaining 
members whose safety values and attitudes are congruent with those of the organization, 
within-organization members’ safety climate perceptions would become more similar. Thus, 
it can be inferred that the relationship between safety climate level and safety behavior would 
be stronger as tenure increases because it would be benefited by decreased safety climate 
variability. This suggests a potential mediation effect of safety climate variability between the 
tenure and safety behavior relationship. However, temporal precedence of tenure over safety 
climate variability has not been established yet. Also, without precluding the possibility of an 
interaction between tenure and safety climate variability, the mediating effect of safety 
climate variability cannot be examined properly (MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007). More 
importantly, in order to examine the unique moderating effect of safety climate variability, 
tenure needs to be viewed as a competing moderator. Thus, tenure can be modeled as an 
additional moderator of the safety climate level and safety behavior relationship besides 
safety climate variability. If safety climate variability is simply an artifact of workers’ tenure, 
the tenure itself will directly moderate the relationship between safety climate level and 
safety behavior while safety climate variability would no longer moderate the safety climate 
and safety behavior relationship.  
Although Beus et al. (2010) focused only on the tenure at the worksite-level, 
individual workers’ worksite tenure could also interact with safety climate variability such 
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that the impact of safety climate variability on safety behavior would be stronger for workers 
with shorter tenure. Workers who are relatively new to the organization or workgroup are yet 
to develop their own mental model for safety and are more likely to rely on small pieces of 
information they have and others’ safety related perception/behavior as means of reducing 
uncertainty. Hence, they are more susceptible to safety climate variability than individuals 
with longer tenure who are more likely to have already established their own conception of 
safety climate.  
 
Hypothesis 2-1 
- The moderating effect of safety climate variability on the safety climate level – safety 
behavior relationship varies in relation to workers’ tenure such that it is stronger for 
workers with longer company tenure (three-way interaction). 
- The safety climate level and safety behavior relationship will be stronger when 
workers’ company tenure is greater (two-way interaction). 
 
Hypothesis 2-2 
- The moderating effect of safety climate variability on the safety climate level – safety 
behavior relationship varies in relation to work-groups’ tenure such that it is stronger 
for workgroups with longer company tenure (three-way interaction). 
- The safety climate level and safety behavior relationship will be stronger when work-
groups’ company tenure is greater (two-way interaction). 
 
Although Hypotheses 2-1 and 2-2 posit an augmenting effect of both workgroup- and 
individual employee-level company tenure on the safety climate level and safety behavior 
relationship, these hypotheses are exploratory. Specifically, the possibility that tenure 
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attenuates the safety climate level and safety behavior relationship was not dismissed because 
workers with longer tenure may hold a well-established personalized mental model for safety 
performance which can be independent of safety climate. Again, the major goal of 
Hypotheses 2-1 and 2-2 was to test the unique moderating effect of safety climate variability 
over workgroup- and individual employee-level company tenure on the safety climate level 
and safety behavior relationship.  
 
Additionally, various task characteristics can be associated with reduced safety 
climate variability (i.e., greater safety climate consensus) considering that particular task 
types may involve more active and frequent interaction with other team members and 
supervisors. At the same time, if safety climate variability is simply the result of task 
characteristics, the task characteristics themselves will directly moderate the relationship 
between safety climate level and safety behavior, while safety climate variability will no 
longer moderate the safety climate and safety behavior relationship.  
Specifically, required job values are known to differ across job types. O*NET online 
(2013) specifies independence as one of the major work values for electrical power-line 
installers and repairers, suggesting that this type of worker needs proper responsibility and 
autonomy to make work-related decisions independently. Workers who perform independent 
tasks tend to have less social influence factors to keep them in check as far as observing, 
learning, and internalizing safety procedures even though their tasks are not always 
individualistic due to the nature of the tasks. For example, line workers perform highly 
specialized installation or repairing jobs in an isolated location such as overhead power line 
while their team members are on the ground supporting this work or working elsewhere at a 
distance on different tasks. Also, for many independent professions workers have higher 
decision latitude and their safety is directly affected by their own decisions. Given this, it is 
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essential for the independent task workers to have a solid and unambiguous mental model of 
workplace safety in order to perform safely. As such, a well-established safety mental model 
is more likely when variability in safety climate is small. Exposure to low safety climate 
variability would be more important for the workers with independent tasks, like electrical 
power-line installers and repair workers, than electrical maintenance and repair workers for 
whom independence is relatively less important. Accordingly, the following hypotheses can 
be drawn: 
 
Hypothesis 3 
- The moderating effect of safety climate variability on the safety climate level – safety 
behavior relationship varies depending on task characteristics, such that it is stronger 
for electrical power-line installers & repair workers than electrical maintenance & 
repair workers (three-way interaction). 
- The safety climate level and safety behavior relationship will be stronger for electrical 
power-line installers & repair workers than electrical maintenance & repair workers 
(two-way interaction). 
 
 Even though Hypothesis 3 postulates the enhancing impact of being independent task 
workers on the safety climate level and safety behavior relationship, this hypothesis was 
exploratory and the opposite possibility was not precluded. Workers with more independent 
jobs may be more reliant on a set of personal skill/knowhow or technology instead of safety 
climate perception. Moreover, if safety climate variability is a simple representation of the 
job categories determined by task independence, the moderation effect of safety climate on 
the relationship between safety climate level and safety behavior would diminish once the job 
categories are introduced in the original moderation equation. 
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Some job types of the electrical utilities such as trouble shooters and meter readers 
are individualistic while other types of jobs such as line, substation, and ground workers are 
crew. It does not mean that the trouble shooters and meter readers don’t belong to any 
particular teams. For instance, there can be a group of trouble shooters or meter readers who 
are supervised by the same supervisor(s) and they may interact one another before they are 
dispatched to the task locations and in some specific occasions such as training and pre-job 
briefing sessions. However, those workers are more frequently exposed to remote or lone-
working situations than other workers with less individualistic tasks. This suggests that 
workers with particular types of jobs would have fewer opportunities for work-related and 
social interaction in regard to safety, which may result in less homogenous safety climate 
perceptions. Also, unlike the non-individualistic or team-based task workers for whom 
collaboration and coordination among workers are of more importance, individualistic task 
workers are less likely to be influenced by their workgroup or organization’s safety values 
and attitudes. Instead, their own unique safety climate perceptions are likely to unfold 
because it is difficult to expect timely feedback or assistance from colleagues or supervisors 
during their individualistic task performance. Hence, the moderation effect of safety climate 
variability on the safety climate level and safety behavior relationship may differ across the 
team-based versus individualistic job categories. A mediating effect of safety climate 
variability between individualistic task and safety behavior relationship can be posited as well. 
However, given that temporal precedence of holding an individualistic task over safety 
climate variability is not yet clearly established, and any potential interaction between 
individualistic task and safety climate variability in relation to safety behavior, Hypothesis 4 
addresses only with the moderating effect of individualistic task and safety climate variability 
for the link between safety climate level and safety behavior. Also, like Hypotheses 2 and 3, 
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Hypothesis 4 aims to test the unique moderating effect of safety climate variability as well as 
its boundary condition, therefore “individualistic task” was introduced as an additional 
moderator of the safety climate level and safety behavior relationship. Accordingly, the 
following hypotheses can be drawn: 
 
Hypothesis 4 
- The moderating effect of safety climate variability on the safety climate level – safety 
behavior relationship varies depending on task characteristics, such that it is stronger 
for team-based task workers than individualistic task workers (three-way interaction). 
- The safety climate level and safety behavior relationship will be stronger for team-
based task workers than individualistic task workers (two-way interaction). 
 
Hypothesis 4 assumes the attenuating effect of being individualistic task workers on 
the safety climate level and safety behavior relationship This hypothesis was exploratory like 
Hypotheses 2 and 3. Thus, the possibility that individualistic task workers have a stronger 
safety climate level and safety behavior relationship than team-based workers was not ruled 
out. This can occur if individualistic task workers who lack instant safety feedback or support 
from management and colleagues tend to strongly rely on safety climate perception because it 
is more available for them.  
 
Figure 1-B is the graphical illustration of Hypotheses 2 to 4. As the diagram suggests, 
the primary goal of these hypotheses were to identify the boundary conditions of the 
moderation effect of safety climate variability on the safety climate level and safety behavior 
relationship. At the same time, the uniqueness of the moderation effect of safety climate 
variability was challenged by additionally introducing interaction variables like tenure, task 
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independence, and individualistic task characteristics that are possibly related to safety 
climate variability. If the moderation effect of safety climate variability is shown to exist even 
after controlling for the factors that may moderate the safety climate level and safety behavior 
relationship, this supports the proposition that not only safety climate level but also its 
variability need to be considered to promote workplace safety. 
Item-level Safety Climate Variability and Safety Behavior 
 Hypotheses 1 through 4 are essentially based on the premise that safety climate 
variability would moderate the relationship between the level of safety climate and safety 
behavior. In other words, it is assumed that a high level of safety climate is a major protective 
factor for workplace safety while an increase in safety climate variability reflects 
organizational contexts, where the impact of safety climate level on safety performance 
would be diminished. On the other hand, safety climate variability itself might be indicative 
of safety hazards not reflected in safety climate level alone. For example, a lack of consensus 
in safety climate perceptions may pose risks of uncoordinated and disintegrated safety 
performance of individuals, hampering joint optimization of processes for safety (Hendrick & 
Kleiner, 2002; Kleiner, 2006). These risks may in turn lead to increases in near misses, 
accidents, and injuries. Therefore, if particular items of a safety climate scale show more 
variability, this may reflect that organizational situations or conditions represented by those 
items are of greater concern because these may be serving as ambiguous cues to team 
members that consistent safety behavior is not necessary. This proposition could be tested by 
looking at the main effect of safety climate variability in prediction of safety behavior. 
However, the present study takes a different approach for two reasons. First, when interaction 
between two factors (i.e., safety climate level and variability) is being considered, the main 
effect of either of the two factors per se is oftentimes less meaningful because it should be 
understood in conjunction with the interaction term (i.e., a product of both the safety climate 
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level and variability). For instance, if there exists a significant interaction, the main effect of 
one factor on the dependent variable can be substantially different, even opposite in direction, 
across different levels of the other factor. Hence, simple observation of main effect can be 
misleading (e.g., Cox, 1984; de González & Cox, 2007). Second, safety climate variability 
can be assessed in different ways. Specifically, in examination of the interaction between 
safety climate level and variability (i.e., Hypotheses 1 to 4), within-workgroup safety climate 
variability is calculated based on the composite score of the safety climate scale. In this 
context, variability of the safety climate scale composite score is more conservative than 
variability of individual items of the scale because large variability of the items with extreme 
ratings will be offset by small variability of other items which are more frequent. This logic 
can explain how multiple-item measurement is more reliable than single-item measurement. 
However, item-level variability can inform for which specific safety climate facets (items) 
workers’ perceptions converge or diverge more than others. Variability may be smaller or 
greater not only within particular workgroups but also consistently across all workgroups. 
More specifically, some items may have smaller or greater variability in groups with high to 
low within-workgroup safety climate variability (i.e., universal variability) while others may 
report varying levels of variability (i.e., workgroup-specific variability). To this end, the mean 
of within-workgroup safety climate variability across different workgroups needs to be 
examined, but which will not be of major interest in the examination of the safety climate 
level and variability interaction. If a certain item’s within-group safety climate variability is 
small across all workgroups, it can be due to the specific aspect of safety climate the item 
represents is so clear that there is relatively little chance of incongruent perception among 
workers. In this case, the item can serve as a conforming cue for safe (i.e., low variability 
with high item mean score, indicating congruently high safety climate) or unsafe behavior 
(i.e., low variability with low item mean score, indicating congruently low safety climate). 
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On the contrary, if an item’s within-group safety climate variability is large across the 
workgroups, this suggests that the item is more susceptible to unsynchronized perception 
among workgroup members possibly due to inconsistent organizational safety procedures and 
practices. Thus, this item may serve as an equivocal cue for variation in safety behavior. 
Based on this line of reasoning, the following hypothesis can be drawn: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Safety climate scale items with less variability will be more predictive of safety 
behavior than scale items with more variability. 
 
 If the safety climate scale items with greater variability are more weakly associated 
with safety behavior than other safety climate scale items with less variability, this would 
again support the importance of using safety climate variability as well as safety climate level 
when monitoring workplace conditions. Also, safety climate scale items that are identified as 
having greater variability across team members can be carefully evaluated to address the 
potential risks of large safety climate variability, potentially suggesting the need for more 
focused efforts for safety that are specific to the high variability items when planning 
workplace interventions.  
Method 
Participants 
 For this study, part of the safety climate research project data was used which was 
collected by the Liberty Mutual Research Institute for Safety (LMRIS) for the development 
and validation of a utility/electrical industry-specific safety climate scale (Huang et al., 
2013b). From two large-sized electrical utilities in the United States, 1,560 (Company 1) and 
861 (Company 2), questionnaires were originally obtained with response rates of 46% and 
74%, respectively. More specific information about the data collection procedures can be 
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found at Huang et al. (2013b). As the primary focus of the present study is safety climate 
variability which is present at workgroup-level, and the moderation effect of safety climate 
variability on safety climate level and safety behavior relationship, this needs to be examined 
within a multi-level analysis framework (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Snijders & Bosker, 
1999). Only the workgroups with three or more members were retained. In the final data 
analysis, 2,049 participants (i.e., 1,428 from Company 1 + 621 from Company 2) nested 
within 183 workgroups were used. In this particular data set, workgroup was defined by 
platforms and departments (task/job types) of the workers. Workers within the same 
workgroup work in the same geographic locations, perform a number of related tasks together, 
and are managed by the same supervisor(s). The number of workgroups (n = 183) was 
appropriate for accurate parameter estimation in multi-level modeling as it is greater than 50 
(Maas & Hox, 2005). The size of the workgroup ranged from 3 to 45 with the mean of 11.20 
(S.D. = 9.73).  
 Demographic information such as gender and age could not be obtained due to 
confidentiality reasons. Most of the utility/electrical workers reported that their company 
tenure was 16 years or more (55.8%). Meanwhile, 9.3%, 14.0%, 19.0%, and 2.0% of the 
workers respectively fell in the company tenure categories of 11-15 years, 6-10 years, 1-5 
years, and less than 1 year. The composition of the types of task/job was different across the 
two electrical utilities. Specifically, in Company 1, there were electric line workers (65.9%), 
substation workers (8.2%), electric metering workers (3.1%), and meter readers (22.9%). In 
Company 2, there were overhead trouble shooters (5.0%), overhead line workers (63.7%), 
substation workers (14.4%), and underground workers (16.9%). Among these job types, 
electric line workers, overhead trouble shooters, and overhead line workers were categorized 
as independent task workers based on O*NET online (2013). Also, electric metering workers 
and meter readers were categorized as individualistic task workers as they work alone in most 
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cases. This information is summarized in Table 1. 
Measures 
 Safety Climate. 19-item group-level subscale of the electric/utility industry-specific 
safety climate scale (Huang et al., 2013b) was utilized to assess safety climate in the 
electrical utilities. Three factors of the scale are supervisory care, participation 
encouragement, and safety straight talk. The safety climate scale is calibrated on 5-point 
Likert scale (1: strongly disagree, 5: strongly agree), and example items include “My 
supervisor discusses ways to improve performance after non-routine or unusual job tasks 
(supervisor care factor)”, “My supervisor makes sure I use all the safety equipment for the 
job (PPE, rubber on lines) (participation encouragement factor)”, and “My supervisor takes 
the time to check on me, especially when I’m stressed or tired (safety straight talk factor)”. 
The scale’s psychometric properties such as construct validity and criterion-related validity 
are well established. More information can be found in Huang et al. (2013b). Internal 
consistency of the scale items was satisfactory with Cronbach’s α = .93.  
Safety climate level at psychological-level (level 1) was calculated by averaging the 
ratings on the 19 items while safety climate level at workgroup-level (level 2) was the mean 
of the within-workgroup members’ psychological-level safety climate level. The aggregation 
of the psychological-level safety climate to create the workgroup safety climate was 
supported by the result of ANOVA analysis (F[182, 1862] = 3.77, p < .01) as well as the 
within-workgroup agreement and reliability statistics like rwgj of .96 and intra-class 
correlation coefficients ICC(1) of .20 and ICC(2) of .73 (Bartko, 1976; James et al., 1984; 
James, Damaree, & Wolf, 1993; Bliese, 2000). rwgj is an index of within-group members’ 
inter-rater agreement (James et al., 1993). A median of rwgj greater than .70 is conventionally 
regarded as an evidence of acceptable within-group agreement (Bliese, 2013). ICC(1) means 
to what extent individuals within the same group agree in their perceptions of their group 
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characteristic (Ostroff & Schmitt, 1993). Although there are no definitive guidelines, ICC(1) 
over .10 indicating medium effect size is widely considered as acceptable (Murphy and 
Myors, 1998). ICC(2) examines whether the groups can be reliably differentiated in terms of 
the aggregated group-level score and it is the reliability measure for the aggregated group-
level score (Bartko, 1976; Ostroff & Schmitt, 1993). Conventionally, the criterion for 
acceptable ICC(2) is over .70 (LeBreton & Senter, 2008; Ostroff & Schmitt, 1993). 
Safety climate variability was measured by calculating the standard deviation of the 
within-workgroup members’ safety climate scores as described in the Safety Climate 
Variability Measurement section, above. As shown in Table 1-A, the range of safety climate 
variability across 183 workgroups was .11 to 1.19 with a mean of .57 (S.D. = .17). 
 Safety Behavior. Employee safety behavior was measured with an 11-item scale 
adapted from Huang, Roetting, McDevitt, Melton, and Smith (2005). The items were 
behaviorally anchored and based on 5-point Likert scale (1: strongly disagree, 5: strongly 
agree). Example items include “I always report back to my supervisor with any safety 
concerns” and “I never throw or toss hand tools to a co-worker on a ladder or in a raised 
bucket”. Cronbach’s α statistics of the 11 items was .67 which is below .70 criteria of 
acceptable internal consistency (Nunnaly & Bernstein, 1994). This could be due to the design 
of the scale in which a broad higher-order construct of workplace safety is measured by a 
series of heterogeneous safety behavior categories, represented by individual items of the 
scale (Clark & Watson, 1995; Tavakol & Dennick, 2011). In other words, even though the 
behavior categories altogether are related to workplace safety, inter-correlations among the 
specific safety behavior categories may be relatively small. As the scale items have good 
content validity, and considering that prior studies have utilized psychological scales with 
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suboptimal (< .70) Cronbach’s α values1, unless they are unacceptably low (< .50; George & 
Mallery, 2003; Kline, 2000), the safety behavior measure was viewed as acceptable in the 
present study. Mean and standard deviation of safety behavior were respectively 3.67 and .50 
for all study participants.  
Analytical Approaches 
Prior to testing the hypotheses, it is important to examine the overall distribution of 
the 183 workgroups in terms of safety climate level and variability. If safety climate 
variability is high or low only in the workgroups with a particular level of safety climate, 
otherwise stated if safety climate variability is substantially specific to safety climate level, 
there can be little implication to study the interaction between safety climate level and 
variability. Specifically, if low safety climate variability is observed mostly in the workgroups 
with very low or high safety climate level, this suggests the possibility that ceiling and/or 
floor effects underestimate the safety climate variability in these particular workgroups. Also, 
if workgroups have low safety climate variability only when they have high safety climate 
level, it would be difficult to generalize the potential implications of the interaction between 
safety climate level and variability to unobserved and less likely situations such as ‘high 
safety climate variability – high safety climate level’ and ‘low safety climate variability – low 
safety climate level’ conditions. Thus, the relationship between safety climate level (at the 
workgroup-level) and variability was examined. More specifically, a quadratic relationship 
was tested by a polynomial regression approach.  
To test Hypotheses 1 through 4, hierarchical liner modeling (HLM; Raudenbush & 
Bryk, 2002) was used to analyze psychological- and workgroup-level variables and 
                                           
1
 For example, 14-item based obsessive compulsive drinking scale’s Cronbach’s α was
 .67 in the study of Teunissen, Spijkerman, Schoenmakers, Vohs, and Engels (2012) 
while 5-item based level of task challenge measure had Cronbach’s α values ranging 
from .54 to .71 in the study of King, Botsford, Hebl, Kazama, Dawson, and Perkins 
(2012). 
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interactions among the study variables (e.g., safety climate variability interacts with 
psychological- and workgroup-level safety climate level in prediction of safety behavior). An 
open source package ‘lme4’ version 1.0-6 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2013; Bates & 
Sarkar, 2007) was utilized in R version 3.0.1 for this analysis. The psychological-level safety 
climate variable was grand-mean centered to reduce potential problems of multicollinearity 
(Cronbach, 1987; Hoffman & Gavin, 1998; Kreft, De Leeuw, & Aiken, 1995). In fact, group-
mean centering is generally preferred to grand-mean centering in examination of cross-level 
or within-level interaction within a multilevel modeling framework (Enders & Tofighi, 2007; 
Hoffman & Gavin, 1998; Preacher, Zyphur, & Zhang, 2010). This is to properly distinguish 
the between- and within-group effects and to minimize the possibility of spurious cross-level 
interaction effect due to a potential interaction between the group (upper)-level moderator 
variable and the between-group variance of the individual (lower)-level predictor. However, 
Bliese (2002) noted that spurious cross-level interaction is uncommon and grand-mean 
centered variables can be utilized to examine cross-level interaction as long as the possibility 
of spurious cross-level interaction is ruled out first by running an additional model based on 
group-mean centered variables. More importantly, Aguinis, Gottfredson, and Culpepper 
(2013) emphasized the theoretical and interpretive implications in making a centering 
decision. Specifically, they stated: “Using group-mean centering suggests that testing 
interactions needs to reflect theoretical processes addressing deviations from a group average 
such as in frog pond/social comparison effects in studies of teams. However, not all theories 
specifically refer to deviations from group averages or have reached that level of 
sophistication (p. 1512)”. If group-mean centered psychological-level safety climate is used 
for the present study’s hierarchical linear modeling, the coefficient of the psychological-level 
safety climate would indicate the estimated change in safety behavior when one’s safety 
climate perception is one unit greater than the overall workgroup members’ mean safety 
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climate perceptions. This means that the coefficient is strictly workgroup-specific. However, 
many previous studies regarding the impact of psychological-level safety climate on safety 
behavior/outcomes (e.g., Beus et al., 2010; Christian et al., 2009; Clark, 2006; Zohar, 2000; 
Zohar & Luria, 2005) have focused not on the relative standing of one’s safety climate 
perception within one’s group, but on the general level of safety climate perceptions of 
individual workers. Hence, to address raw differences between psychological-level safety 
climate entities rather than differences relative to a workgroup mean, the present study 
utilized the grand-mean centered psychological-level safety climate. Given that, the 
coefficient of the psychological-level safety climate indicates the estimated change in safety 
behavior by a one unit increase in individual worker’s safety climate perception in this study. 
Safety climate variability, which is a continuous numeric workgroup-level variable, was not 
centered as it was constant within each workgroup, where use of grand-mean centered or raw 
metric variable would only affect the intercept (Enders & Tofighi, 2007).  
Initially, a model with every possible fixed (i.e., level 1 and level 2 predictors and 
their interaction terms) and random (i.e., random intercept and slope) effect was examined. 
Then, a fixed effect term with non-significant and smallest standard error adjusted coefficient 
(along with its corresponding random effect term, if available) was omitted to create a more 
parsimonious alternative model. If the initial model and the alternative model were not 
significantly different in terms of goodness of fit, the alternative model was preferred because 
it is more parsimonious. For the model comparison, model fit indexes such as Akaike 
information criterion (AIC), Bayesian information criterion (BIC), and deviance statistics 
were utilized. A model with smaller AIC and/or BIC is preferred and the deviance is equal to 
inverse of twice the log-likelihood while it asymptotically follows the χ² distribution. Thus, a 
χ² difference test can be applied in this model comparison. This procedure of model trimming 
and comparison was repeated until the most parsimonious model was identified without 
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significantly losing explanatory power. However, as long as an interaction term was retained 
in the model, main effects were retained regardless of their statistical significance according 
to the suggestions of both Nelder (1977) and Cox (1984).  
 To test Hypotheses 5, overall mean safety climate variability across workgroups was 
calculated for every safety climate scale item. Also, mean of variance below and also above 
the workgroup mean were calculated for the individual safety climate items. The reason why 
variance is utilized instead of standard deviation in this context is as follows. If standard 
deviation is computed specifically with item ratings above or below the workgroup mean, the 
degree to which these ratings deviate from overall workgroup mean cannot be properly 
represented because the reference will be shifted from workgroup mean to the average of the 
item ratings that are above or below workgroup mean. Therefore, the square of [item rating – 
workgroup item mean] was averaged across workgroups only when the item rating was 
smaller than workgroup item mean in order to get the mean of item variance below 
workgroup mean. Likewise, the square of [item rating –workgroup item mean] was averaged 
across workgroup only when the item rating is greater than workgroup item mean to get the 
mean of item variance above the workgroup mean. Lastly, individual item’s correlation with 
safety behavior was then computed to get rank order correlations (Spearman’s ρ) with the 
three item-level variability indicators (i.e., overall mean safety climate variability as well as 
the means of item variance both above and below the workgroup mean).  
 
Results 
Safety Climate Variability across Workgroups 
The relationship between safety climate level (at workgroup-level) and variability 
was examined based on the polynomial regression equation as follows. In the equation, SC 
indicates safety climate. 
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SC variability = β0 + β1 × (SC level) + β2 × (SC level)
2
 + e            (1) 
 
Instead of a curved quadratic relationship, a simple linear relationship between safety 
climate level and variability was detected with β0 = .58 (S.E. = .02, p < .01), β1 = -.11 (S.E. 
= .04, p < .01), and β2 = -.05 (S.E. = .06, p = .38). This indicates the low likelihood of safety 
climate variability systematically getting closer to relatively greater or smaller values as 
safety climate level approaches to its both ends. The predictors accounted for 4.3% of the 
variance of safety climate variability (i.e., R
2
 = .043). The correlation between safety climate 
variability and level was .20 (p < .01) indicating small effect size (Cohen, 1988). No 
particular sign of a ceiling or floor effect was detected with this simple linear trend between 
safety climate level and variability. A scatter plot of safety climate level and variability was 
presented in Figure 2 and Table 2 shows the workgroup distribution by above- and below-
mean safety climate level and variability. Specifically, 23.5% of workgroups (n = 43) had 
above-mean safety climate level and variability while 17.5% of workgroups (n = 32) had 
below-mean safety climate level and variability. In addition, 33.3% of workgroups (n = 61) 
had above-mean safety climate level and below-mean safety climate variability while 25.7% 
of workgroups (n = 47) had below-mean safety climate level and above-mean safety climate 
variability. These findings together suggest that safety climate variability is not remarkably 
specific to safety climate level, and variation of safety climate variability was present across 
the overall continuum of safety climate level.  
Between Workgroup Variance In Safety Behavior 
An HLM approach attempts to separate within- and between-group variance to 
address the possibility of inflated type I error (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002) which is of more 
concern when between-group variance is higher. In order to investigate the between-
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workgroup variance in safety behavior, which is the dependent variable of the present study, a 
null model like that found below was tested: 
 
Level 1: Safety Behaviorij = β0j + rij  
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + U0j                                                (2) 
 
In the above equation, i indicates individual worker while j indicates workgroup 
where the individual i belongs to. Also, rij indicates individual worker-level residual while U0j 
indicates variance in safety behavior across workgroups. γ00 is the grand mean of all 
workgroups’ safety behavior. The percent of variance in safety behavior that is between 
workgroups can be denoted by the intra class correlation (ICC) which can be computed by 
the following equation in which σ2 represents the variance of rij while τ00 represents the 
variance of U0j: 
 
 ICC = τ00 / (σ
2
 + τ00)                            (3) 
 
The ICC was .073 suggesting that 7.3% of the variance in safety behavior exists at 
the workgroup-level. In past research, ICC values have ranged from 0 to .50, with a median 
of .12 (James, 1982; Ostroff & Schmitt, 1993), and so the observed ICC of .073 might seem 
not that impressive. However as depicted in Figure 3, safety climate level (at the 
psychological-level) and safety behavior relationship pattern were considerably different 
across the workgroups.  
Thus, to what extent safety climate variability can explain the different safety climate 
level and safety behavior relationship patterns is definitely worthwhile to examine, and the 
appropriateness of the application of HLM framework to the study data is justified. 
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HLM Results for Hypothesis 1 
Figure 4 illustrates Hypothesis 1, which involves both within-level (i.e., workgroup-
level safety climate level and safety climate variability) and cross-level (i.e., psychological-
level safety climate level and safety climate variability) interactions. Accordingly, an HLM 
model with all possible predictors of safety behavior, namely workgroup-level safety climate 
level (G-SC), psychological-level safety climate level (P-SC), safety climate variability (SC 
variability), G-SC × SC variability, and P-SC × SC variability, was initially tested. The 
intercept of the model and slope statistic of the level 1 predictor (i.e., P-SC) were allowed to 
randomly vary across workgroups. This model is represented as H1 Model 1 in Table 3. Not 
every predictor had a statistically significant coefficient. Particularly, the t value (= 
coefficient / S.E. = .05 / .23 = .21, p = .83) of the coefficient of G-SC × SC variability was the 
smallest, suggesting that there is only minimal interaction effect between workgroup-level 
safety climate level and safety climate variability. Thus, in the more parsimonious alternative 
model of H1 Model 2 (Table 3), the G-SC × SC variability term was omitted and this did not 
yield statistically significant model fit deterioration (i.e., Δχ² = .05, Δdf = 1, p = .83). In fact, 
AIC decreased from 2649 to 2647 while BIC also decreased from 2705 to 2698, indicating 
model fit improvement. In the H1 Model 2, the coefficient of G-SC had the smallest t value 
of -.84 and it was statistically not significant (p = .40). This suggests that workgroup-level 
safety climate level is not a statistically significant predictor of employee safety behavior in 
presence of other predictors. Hence, the G-SC term was omitted in the more parsimonious 
alternative model of H1 Model 3 (Table 3) and the omission did not result in statistically 
significant model fit worsening (i.e., Δχ² = .62, Δdf = 1, p = .43). Also, model fit improvement 
in terms of AIC (2647 → 2646) and BIC (2698 → 2691) was observed. Although the 
coefficient of the SC variability in H1 Model 3 was statistically not significant (γ02 = .13, S.E. 
= .08, p = .08), it needed to be kept in the model because the interaction term of P-SC × SC 
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variability was statistically significant (γ11 = -.26, S.E. = .11, p < .05). As mentioned in the 
Method section, main effect terms need to be retained in the interaction effect testing model 
even though they don’t have statistically significant coefficients (Cox, 1984; Nelder, 1977). 
Another main effect term P-SC was retained in the model for the same reason and it had 
statistically significant coefficient (γ10 = .44, S.E. = .07, p < .01). Intercept of the model was 
3.58 (S.E. = .05, p < .01) and no further model simplification was needed. The H1 Model 3 
represented in the following equations suggests that the workers’ safety behavior is 3.58 (on a 
1 – 5 scale) when their psychological-level safety climate level is equal to the overall mean, 
and one unit increase in psychological-level safety climate level is associated with a .44 
increase of safety behavior. At the same time, if safety climate variability in one workgroup is 
one unit higher than another, the impact of psychological-level safety climate level in 
prediction of safety behavior was smaller by -.13 (= -.26 [γ11] + .13 [γ02]) while the safety 
climate variability per se does not significantly predict safety behavior. 
 
                Level 1: Safety Behaviorij = β0j + β1j×(P-SCij) + rij  
 Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01×(G-SCj) + γ02×(SC variabilityj) 
+ γ03×(G-SCj)×(SC variabilityj) + U0j 
Level 2: β1j = γ10 + γ11×(SC variabilityj) + U1j                               (4) 
 
           Safety Behaviorij = γ00+ γ02×(P-SCij) + γ10×(SC variabilityj) + U0j  
+ γ11×(P-SCij)×(SC variabilityj) + U1j×(P-SCij) + rij               (4)’ 
 
These findings supported Hypothesis 1 of the present study. However, it should be 
noted that even though safety climate is oftentimes viewed as an upper-individual-level 
notion, interaction of safety climate variability was shown to occur only with psychological -
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level (i.e., individual-level) safety climate level, instead of workgroup-level safety climate 
level in prediction of workers’ safety behavior.  
To examine what proportion of between-workgroup variance can be explained by the 
interaction between safety climate level at psychological-level and safety climate variability, 
H1 Model 4, which didn’t include the interaction term (i.e., P-SC × SC variability) was tested 
and the result is shown in Table 3. Exclusion of the interaction term induced a statistically 
significant model fit deterioration as presented in Table 4 (i.e., Δχ² = 6.09, Δdf = 1, p < .05). 
Even though BIC was somewhat improved from 2691 to 2689 due to the lower number of 
parameters to estimate (c.f., BIC penalizes model complexity), AIC increased from 2646 to 
2650. More importantly, the between workgroup-variance of the psychological-level safety 
climate and safety behavior relationship was greater in H1 Model 4 (i.e., var{γ11[H1 Model 4]} = 
τ11[H1 Model 4] = .014) than in H1 Model 3 (i.e., var{γ11[H1 Model 3]} = τ11[H1 Model 3] = .012). The 
proportional reduction based on the following equation (5) was 14.3% (= [.014 - .012]×100 
/ .014).  
 
[τ11(H1 Model 4) - τ11(H1 Model 3)] ×100 / τ11(H1 Model 4)                            (5) 
 
In other words, the interaction term explained 14.3% of the between-workgroup 
variability of the psychological-level safety climate and safety behavior relationship. 
Figure 5 depicts the observed moderation effect of safety climate variability. The 
solid and dotted estimation lines in the figure that were based on the HLM coefficients of H1 
Model 3, respectively represent the different patterns of relationship between psychological-
level safety climate level and safety behavior in the high and low safety climate variability 
conditions. The relationship between psychological-level safety climate level and safety 
behavior was found to be more marked when safety climate variability is smaller.  
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Finally, when grand-mean centered P-SC in H1 Model 3 was replaced with group-
mean centered (a.k.a., centering within cluster; CWC) variable, P-SC and SC variability 
interaction term was still statistically significant (γ11 = -.30, S.E. = .12, p < .05). Moreover, 
when the group-mean of the P-SC (which is equal to workgroup-level safety climate level, G-
SC) and SC variability interaction was additionally controlled for according to Aguinis et al. 
(2013)’s suggestion, the interaction between P-SC and SC variability was still statistically 
significant (γ11 = -.28, S.E. = .12, p < .05). These findings rule out the possibility that the 
significant P-SC and SC variability interaction is simply due to spurious cross-level 
interaction effects (Enders & Tofighi, 2007; Hoffman & Gavin, 1998).  
In sum, the results jointly supported Hypothesis 1 such that higher safety climate 
variability tends to attenuate the relationship between psychological-level safety climate level 
and workers’ safety behavior. Workgroup-level safety climate level (G-SC) and safety climate 
variability (SC variability) didn’t show a statistically significant interaction. Thus, H1 Model 
3 served as a baseline model for testing Hypotheses 2 through 4.  
HLM Results for Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2-1. Figure 6-A is the graphical representation of Hypothesis 2-1 and 
Tables 5 and 6 are the summary of the HLM results. At the beginning, the H2-1 Model 1 was 
created by additionally including employee’s company tenure variable to H-1 Model 3, the 
final model for testing Hypothesis 1. Specifically, the model had level 1 predictors such as P-
SC, employee’s company tenure (tenure), and their interaction term (P-SC × tenure), level 2 
predictor SC variability, as well as its interaction terms (with the included level 1 predictors). 
Like the Hypotheses 1 testing procedure, the intercept of the model and all the level 1 
predictors’ slope statistics in prediction of safety behavior were allowed to randomly vary 
across workgroups. Except for the intercept, none of the coefficients were statistically 
significant. Particularly, the coefficients for the P-SC × tenure × SC variability (γ31) reported 
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the smallest t values in general (ranged from -.01 to .17 for the four dummy code variables). 
The PSC × tenure × SC variability term was deleted in the more parsimonious alternative 
model H2-1 Model 2 and the two models were not statistically significantly different in terms 
of goodness of fit (i.e., Δχ² = .80, Δdf = 4, p = .93). Instead, other goodness of fit indices 
indicated improved fit such that AIC decreased from 2666 to 2658 and BIC also decreased 
from 3091 to 3062 (Table 6). In H2-1 Model 2, the coefficient for tenure × SC variability (γ21) 
generally got the smallest and non-significant t values in general (ranged from -.05 to -.61 for 
the four dummy code variables). Hence the coefficient was removed and a more 
parsimonious alternative model, H2-1 Model 3, was created. In terms of goodness of fit, there 
was no statistically significant difference between H2-1 Model 2 and H2-1 Model 3 (i.e., Δχ² 
= 2.82, Δdf = 4, p = .89). Moreover, AIC (2658 → 2653) and BIC (3062 → 3034) showed 
improvement (Table 6). Although SC variability did not have the statistically significant 
coefficient (γ01 = .11, S.E. = .08, p = .17), it was retained in the model as it showed 
statistically significant interaction with P-SC (γ11 = -.26, S.E. = .10, p < .05). Other 
coefficients for P-SC (γ10), tenure (γ20), and P-SC × tenure (γ30) were all statistically 
significant as presented in Table 5. Therefore, no additional model simplification was needed 
and H2-1 Model 3 was the final model for testing Hypothesis 2-1, and this is presented below.  
 
Level 1: Safety Behaviorij = β0j + β1j×(P-SCij) + β2j×(tenureij) + β3j×(P-SCij)×(tenureij) + rij 
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01×(SC variabilityj) + U0j  
Level 2: β1j = γ10 + γ11×(SC variabilityj) + U1j  
Level 2: β2j = γ20 + γ21×(SC variabilityj) + U2j  
Level 2: β3j = γ30 + γ31×(SC variabilityj) + U3j                         (6) 
 
Safety Behaviorij = γ00+ γ01×(SC variabilityj) + U0j + γ10×(P-SCij) 
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+ γ11×(SC variabilityj)×(P-SCij) + U1j×(P-SCij) + γ20×(tenureij) + U2j×(tenureij)  
+ γ30×(P-SCij)×(tenureij) + U3j×(P-SCij)×(tenureij) + rij             (6)’ 
 
According to this final model, workers’ overall safety behavior was 3.45 (on a 1 – 5 
scale) when psychological-level safety climate level was equal to overall mean and employee 
company tenure was less than one year. When employee company tenure was 16 or more 
years, safety behavior tended to be higher by .18 compared to workers with less than one year 
of tenure. As psychological-level safety climate level increases one unit, .70 of safety 
behavior increase is expected. Also, psychological-level safety climate level showed 
significant interaction with employee company tenure such that workers with 6 to 10 years of 
company tenure tended to have reduced impact of psychological-level safety climate level and 
safety behavior relationship by .28, workers with 11 to 15 years of company tenure tended to 
have reduced impact of psychological-level safety climate level and safety behavior 
relationship by .37, workers with 16 or more years of company tenure tended to have reduced 
impact of psychological-level safety climate level and safety behavior relationship by .28 all 
compared to workers with less than one year of company tenure. Safety climate variability 
did not show a statistically significant effect on safety behavior by itself but it did show a 
statistically significant interaction with psychological-level safety climate level. Specifically, 
one unit increase in safety climate variability induced a decreased impact of psychological-
level safety climate level on safety behavior by .15 (= -.26 [γ11] + .11 [γ01]). In sum, these 
findings showed that safety climate variability significantly moderated the relationship 
between psychological-level safety climate level and safety behavior, which is in congruent 
with the result of Hypothesis 1 testing. However, potential interaction between employee 
company tenure and safety climate variability was not supported, rejecting Hypothesis 2-1. 
Safety climate variability was shown to have unique effect on safety climate level and safety 
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behavior relationship even when employee company tenure was controlled for. 
Hypothesis 2-2. Figure 6-B is the graphical representation of Hypothesis 2-2 and 
Tables 5 and 6 are the summary of the HLM results. As a first step, H2-2 Model 1 was 
created by adding in workgroup’s company tenure variable to H-1 Model 3, the final model 
for testing Hypothesis 1. In detail, the model had a level 1 predictor of P-SC, level 2 
predictors such as SC variability, workgroup company tenure (tenure), and their interaction 
term (tenure × SC variability) as well as the workgroup company tenure’s interaction terms 
(with P-SC and tenure × SC variability). Like the Hypotheses 1 and 2-1 testing procedures, 
intercept of the model and all the level 1 predictors’ slope statistics in prediction of safety 
behavior were allowed to randomly vary across workgroups. All coefficients of H2-2 Model 1 
were statistically non-significant except for intercept. Particularly, the coefficient for tenure × 
SC variability term (γ03) reported the smallest t values ranged from .06 (p = .95) to .23 (p 
= .81) across different dummy coded variables, and so this term was not included in the more 
parsimonious alternative model H2-2 Model 2. The two models (i.e., H2-2 Model 1 and H2-2 
Model 2) did not showed statistically significant model fit difference as shown in Table 8 (i.e., 
Δχ² = 2.59, Δdf = 3, p = .46). In fact, improvement in model fit was observed in terms of AIC 
(2652 → 2649) and BIC (2765 → 2744). None of the coefficients of H2-2 Model 2 was 
statistically significant except for intercept and another predictor term with the least 
coefficient, which was P-SC × tenure × SC variability (γ13) was omitted in the more 
parsimonious alternative model H2-2 Model 3. In H2-2 Model 2, this term had t values 
ranging from .06 (p = .95) to .40 (p = .69) for different dummy coded variables. No 
significant model fit deterioration was detected followed by the omission of P-SC × tenure × 
SC variability (i.e., Δχ² = 2.45, Δdf = 3, p = .48) as shown in Table 8. Also, AIC decreased 
from 2649 to 2645 while BIC decreased from 2744 to 2724, suggesting improved fit. Still, 
some coefficients of H2-2 Model 3 (γ01, γ02, and γ11) were statistically non-significant. Among 
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these, the coefficient for tenure term reported the smallest t values ranging from -.05 (p = .96) 
to -1.41 (p = .16) but this term need to be kept in the model because its interaction with P-SC 
was yet present in the model. Thus, in the following parsimonious alternative model H2-2 
Model 4, tenure × P-SC term which showed the second smallest t values ranging from -.90 (p 
= .37) to -1.69 (p = .09) was omitted and this did not yield statistically significant model fit 
difference (i.e., Δχ² = 4.63, Δdf = 3, p = .20). At the same time, AIC (2645 → 2644) and BIC 
(2724 → 2706) showed improvement. In H2-2 Model 4, coefficients for workgroup company 
tenure (γ01) and SC variability (γ02) were statistically non-significant. However, SC variability 
needed to be retained in the model as its interaction with P-SC was statistically significant 
(γ11 = -.28, S.E. = .11, p < .01). Hence, the workgroup company tenure variable was 
additionally deleted in the revised alternative model H2-2 Model 5 to make it even more 
parsimonious. In fact, this resulted in statistically significant model fit difference (i.e., Δχ² = 
7.96, Δdf = 3, p < .05). While AIC slightly increased from 2644 to 2646, BIC decreased from 
2706 to 2691. Given that τ11 (= between workgroup variance in the slope statistic for P-SC in 
prediction of worker’s safety behavior) for H2-2 Model 4 and H2-2 Model 5 were all .012, it 
can be inferred that the workgroup company tenure variable did not explain much of between 
workgroup difference in P-SC and safety behavior relationship. Thus, even though H2-2 
Model 4 (a model with workgroup company tenure variable) reported somewhat better model 
fit, H2-2 Model 5 (a model without workgroup company tenure variable) was preferred as 
workgroup company tenure variable had a non-significant coefficient with minimal 
explanatory power.  
In sum, H2-2 Model 5 was the final model for Hypothesis 2-2 and it was exactly the 
same as the final model for Hypothesis 1 (H1 Model 3, Table 3). The moderation effect of 
workgroup’s company tenure on the relationship between psychological-level safety climate 
level and safety behavior relationship (Hypothesis 2-2) was not supported, while the 
SAFETY CLIMATE VARIABILITY 45 
 
 
moderation effect of safety climate variability was supported.  
HLM Results for Hypothesis 3 
Figure 7 illustrates Hypothesis 3 and HLM results for Hypothesis 3 are presented in 
Tables 9 and 10. The first HLM model examined was created by incorporating a level 2 
predictor, task independence, to the final model for Hypothesis 1 (H1 Model 3). Specifically, 
the model (H3 Model 1) had a level 1 predictor P-SC, level 2 predictors of task independence 
(idpt), SC variability, and their interaction term (idpt × SC variability). Also, interactions 
between the level 1 and 2 variables were specified (i.e., P-SC × idpt, P-SC × SC variability, 
& P-SC × idpt × SC variability). Like the models for Hypotheses 1, 2-1, and Hypothesis 2-2, 
the intercept of the model as well as the slope statistic for P-SC in prediction of safety 
behavior were allowed to randomly vary across workgroups. Not every coefficient in H3 
Model 1 was statistically significant, and particularly, the coefficient for idpt × SC variability 
(γ03) reported as the smallest t value of -1.12 (p = .26). Thus, the idpt × SC variability term 
was removed in the following alternative model H3 Model 2. This omission did not yield 
statistically significant model fit worsening (i.e., Δχ² = 1.25, Δdf = 1, p = .26) and 
improvement in AIC (2633 → 2632) and BIC (2701 → 2694) observed, as presented in Table 
10. In H3 Model 2, idpt × SC variability × P-SC (γ11) had a statistically non-significant 
coefficient while all other predictor and interaction terms had significant coefficients (Table 
9). Thus, the idpt × SC variability × P-SC term was omitted in H3 Model 3 and this model 
was not significantly different from H3 Model 2 in terms of goodness of fit (i.e., Δχ² = 2.84, 
Δdf = 1, p = .13). AIC slightly increased from 2632 to 2633 but BIC decreased from 2694 to 
2689 Table 10). In H3 Model 3, all coefficients were statistically significant and there was no 
need to further simplify the model. Thus this model was the final model for Hypothesis 3 and 
it was presented below.  
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Level 1: Safety Behaviorij = β0j + β1j×(P-SCij) + rij 
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01×(idptj) + γ02×(SC variabilityj) + γ03×(idptj)×(SC variabilityj) +U0j 
Level 2: β1j = γ10 + γ11×(idptj) + γ12×(SC variabilityj) + γ13×(idptj)×(SC variabilityj) + U1j  (7) 
 
Safety Behaviorij = γ00 + γ01×(idptj) + γ02×(SC variabilityj) + γ03×(idptj)×(SC variabilityj) +U0j 
+ γ10×(P-SCij) + γ11×(idptj)×(P-SCij) + γ12×(SC variabilityj)×(P-SCij) 
+ γ13×(idptj)×(SC variabilityj) + U1×(P-SCij)                           (7)’ 
 
Based on H3 Model 3 and its coefficient estimates, the following interpretation is 
possible. Safety behavior was 3.63 (on a 1 – 5 scale) when psychological-level safety climate 
level was set equal to the overall mean, one’s task/job was not highly independent, and one’s 
workgroup had zero safety climate variability. Compared to workers from non-independent 
task/job workgroups, workers from highly independent task/job workgroups tended to have a 
lower level of safety behavior by .11 when other variables were held equal. One unit increase 
in safety climate variability was associated with .16 of increase in safety behavior when 
workers were from non-independent task/job workgroups and psychological-level safety 
climate level was equal to the overall mean. Also, one unit increase in psychological-level 
safety climate level was anticipated to result in .47 of increase in safety behavior when 
workers were from non-independent task/job workgroups, and safety climate variability was 
zero. The impact of psychological-level safety climate level on safety behavior was 
significantly moderated by task independence such that it decreased by .08 for highly 
independent task/job workgroups compared to non-independent task/job workgroups. In 
addition, the impact of psychological-level safety climate level on safety behavior was 
significantly moderated by safety climate variability such that it decreased by.08 (= -.24 [γ12] 
+ .16 [γ02]) for every one unit increase in safety climate variability.  
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These findings failed to support Hypothesis 3, and actually the relationship between 
safety climate level (psychological-level) and safety behavior was weaker for workgroups 
with highly independent task/job (i.e., electrical power-line installers & repair workers) than 
workgroups with non-independent task/job (i.e., electrical maintenance & repair workers), 
which is the inverse of the relationship predicted by Hypothesis 3. Meanwhile, the 
moderation effect of safety climate variability was again supported. When safety climate 
variability was higher, the link between psychological-level safety climate level and safety 
behavior was less marked even when the effect of task independence was controlled for.  
HLM Results for Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 is illustrated in Figure 8, and HLM results for Hypothesis 4 are 
summarized in Tables 11 and 12. The initial HLM model H4 Model 1 was created by 
including a level 2 predictor, individualistic task, to the final model for Hypothesis 1 (H1 
Model 3). This model consists of a level 1 predictor of P-SC and level 2 predictors such as 
individualistic task (idvl), SC variability, and their interaction term idvl × SC variability. Also, 
interactions between the level 1 and 2 predictors such as P-SC × idvl, P-SC × SC variability, 
and P-SC × idvl × SC variability were specified in the model. Consistent with the models for 
Hypotheses H1 through H4, random intercept and slope across workgroups were allowed. In 
H4 Model 1, the coefficient for P-SC × idvl × SC variability (γ13) had the smallest and 
statistically non-significant t value of -.08 (p = .94). Hence, P-SC × idvl × SC variability term 
was excluded in the more parsimonious alternative model H4 Model 2. The exclusion did not 
produce statistically significant model fit deterioration (i.e., Δχ² = .01, Δdf = 1, p = .93) and 
AIC decreased from 2652 to 2650 while BIC decreased from 2719 to 2711 (Table 12). Thus, 
H4 Model 2 was preferred over H4 Model 1. The coefficient of the interaction term of idvl × 
p-SC (γ11) in H4 Model 2 had the smallest and statistically non-significant t values that ranged 
from .80 (p = .42) and .95(p = .34). Therefore, the following alternative model H4 Model 3 
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did not include this term but no goodness of fit worsening was observed (i.e., Δχ² = .63, Δdf = 
1, p = .43). AIC (2650 → 2648) and BIC (2711 → 2704) were reduced as well (Table 12). 
The model was additionally trimmed by removing the interaction term idvl × SC variability 
as its coefficient (γ03) had the smallest and statistically non-significant t value of .85 (p = .40). 
The H4 Model 4 which did not have idvl × SC variability term showed no model fit 
worsening compared to H4 Model 3 (i.e., Δχ² = .71, Δdf = 1, p = .40). AIC (2648 → 2647) 
and BIC (2704 → 2698) showed improvement (Table 12). Further model simplification was 
implemented (H4 Model 5) by removal of idvl variable as its coefficient (γ01) had statistically 
non-significant and smallest t value of -.96 (p = .34). This did not yield any significant model 
fit change compared to H4 Model 4 (i.e., Δχ² = .90, Δdf = 1, p = .34). Improvement in AIC 
(2647 → 2646) and BIC (2698 → 2691) detected (Table 12). In H4 Model 5, SC variability 
had statistically non-significant coefficient (γ02 = .13, S.E. = .08, p = .34), however it did not 
need to be removed from the model as its interaction with P-SC was statistically significant 
(γ12 = -.26, S.E. = .11, p < .05). All other coefficients in H4 Model 5 were statistically 
significant, so it was the final model for Hypothesis 5. The model is in fact equal to the final 
models of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2-2, suggesting that individualistic task was neither a 
significant predictor of safety behavior by itself nor did it significantly interact with 
psychological-level safety climate level and safety climate variability.  
In sum, Hypothesis 4 was not supported. Psychological-level safety climate level and 
safety behavior relationship was not different across workers with more and less 
individualistic task/job. On the other hand, the moderation effect of safety climate variability 
was supported again.  
Results for Hypothesis 5 
Item-level mean, mean of item-level within-workgroup standard deviation (i.e., 
safety climate variability) across workgroups, mean of item-level variance below workgroup 
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mean, and mean of item-level variance above workgroup mean for every 19 items of the 
utilized safety climate scale were presented in Table 13. It also shows the correlation between 
safety climate scale item rating and workers’ safety behavior for each of the 19 safety climate 
scale items. Rank order correlation analysis showed that safety climate scale items with 
higher safety climate variability tended to have weaker correlation between item rating and 
safety behavior (ρ = -.62, p < .01). In other words, safety climate scale items of stronger 
perceptual consensus within workgroups are more predictive of the workers’ general safety 
behaviors. This finding is in favor of Hypothesis 5. When safety climate variability at the 
item-level was decomposed into below and above workgroup mean, they did not show 
statistically significant rank order correlations with the correlation between item rating and 
safety behavior. Specifically, item rank order by mean of item-level variance below 
workgroup mean was correlated with item rank order by correlation between the item rating 
and safety behavior with ρ = .32 (p = .19). Item rank order by mean of item-level variance 
above workgroup mean was correlated with item rank order by correlation between item 
rating and safety behavior with ρ = -.29 (p = .23).  
These findings suggest that what was more relevant to safety climate item’s safety 
behavior prediction was overall safety climate variability within workgroups, rather than the 
direction of safety climate variability (i.e., below or above workgroup mean variability). At 
the same time, it needs to be considered that the rank of item-level mean was very highly 
correlated with item rank by correlation between item rating and safety behavior with ρ = .91 
(p < .01). Also, item-level mean was significantly and negatively correlated with item-level 
safety climate variability mean (r = -.67, p < .01). Put differently, a lack of consensus in 
safety climate perception was more likely when ratings on the safety climate scale items were 
smaller while at the same time these items of lower mean and greater within-workgroup 
variability were less predictive of worker’s safety behavior.  
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Discussion 
In the present study which utilized a sample of electrical utility workers, an HLM 
approach was adopted to examine how the effect of safety climate level on purported safety 
behavior differs depending on safety climate variability. Specifically, it was hypothesized that 
stronger safety climate variability might attenuate the impact of safety climate on safety 
behavior because a lack of consensus in safety climate perceptions within the workgroup may 
be indicative of suboptimal safety efforts and practices, defective team member coordination, 
and organizational tolerance to unsafe behavior. Also, potential boundary conditions for the 
interaction between safety climate level and variability were investigated in order to probe in 
which particular contexts this interaction occurs, and to identify any possible confounding 
effects of individual and organizational factors on safety climate variability. To this end, 
factors like individual worker’s company tenure, the workgroup’s company tenure, task 
independence, and individualistic tasks were considered. Finally, the strength of the safety 
climate scale items’ correlation with safety behavior was compared to each items’ safety 
climate variability across overall workgroups. Items with less variability were assumed to be 
more closely linked to safety behavior because these items would serve as more 
straightforward cues for safe occupational behavior.  
Results Summary 
The results in general consistently supported the primary interest of the present study, 
namely the moderation effect of safety climate variability on the relationship between safety 
climate level and safety behavior. Specifically, the final HLM model for testing Hypothesis 1 
included the interaction term of psychological-level safety climate level and safety climate 
variability as it had a statistically significant coefficient and it accounted for 14.3% of the 
total between-workgroup variability of the psychological-level safety climate level and safety 
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behavior relationship. This relationship tended to become weaker as safety climate variability 
increased, as originally hypothesized. However, workgroup-level safety climate level did not 
have a statistically significant interaction with safety climate variability nor did it have any 
statistically significant main effect on safety behavior. Considered jointly, Hypothesis 1 was 
supported but the moderating effect of safety climate variability was present for the safety 
climate level and safety behavior relationship only at the psychological -level (i.e., 
individual-level).  
The final model of Hypothesis 1 served as the baseline model for Hypotheses 2 to 4 
which aimed at testing boundary conditions of the interaction between psychological-level 
safety climate level and variability in prediction of safety behavior. Each of the hypothesized 
boundary condition factors was introduced to the model, and all possible interactions were 
assumed. In the final model for testing Hypothesis 2-1, employee tenure showed a 
statistically significant interaction with psychological-level safety climate in prediction of 
safety behavior, and the effect of psychological-level safety climate level on safety behavior 
tended to be smaller for employees with longer company tenure. However, Hypothesis 2-1 
was not supported because employee company tenure lacked a statistically significant 
interaction with both safety climate variability and with the interaction term of psychological-
level safety climate level and safety climate variability. This indicated that the moderating 
effect of safety climate variability on the relationship between psychological-level safety 
climate level and safety behavior did not systematically differ by employee tenure. Even after 
partialling out the effect of employee company tenure on safety behavior, statistically 
significant psychological-level safety climate level and variability interaction was still 
detected.  
In order to test Hypothesis 2-2, company tenure of overall workgroup members was 
introduced into to the baseline model for the moderation effect of safety climate variability 
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(final model for Hypothesis 1). Workgroup company tenure also did not have a statistically 
significant interaction with safety climate variability or with the interaction term of 
psychological-level safety climate level and safety climate variability, resulting in Hypothesis 
2-2 to be rejected. In fact, workgroup company tenure did not interact with psychological-
level safety climate level either, so the final model for Hypothesis 2-2 ended up being equal to 
the final model for Hypothesis 1 after a series of model simplifications. Since it turned out 
that workgroup company tenure had minimal impact on the moderating effect of safety 
climate variability on the psychological-level safety climate level and safety behavior, 
Hypothesis 2-2 was rejected.  
HLM models for testing Hypothesis 3 revealed that electrical utility workers with 
more independent tasks tended to be less reliant on psychological-level safety climate in 
pursuit of safety behavior compared to the workers with less independent tasks, as expected. 
However, the omission of the task independence interaction terms with safety climate 
variability (i.e., task independence × safety climate variability & task independence × 
psychological-level safety climate level × safety climate variability) from the initial HLM 
model, in which all possible interactions of task independence were assumed in the final 
Hypothesis 1 model, did not result in statistically significant model fit worsening. These 
results suggest that the moderating effect of safety climate variability on the association 
between psychological-level safety climate level and safety behavior was not influenced by 
the independence of worker’s tasks, and so Hypothesis 3 was not supported. 
As a result of a sequential model simplification, the final model for Hypothesis 4 was 
the same as the final model for Hypothesis 1. The results showed that the moderating effect 
of safety climate variability on the psychological-level safety climate level and safety 
behavior relationship was not statistically significantly different across workers with 
individualistic and those with less individualistic tasks. Also, individualistic tasks did not 
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interact with psychological-level safety climate level either. Jointly, Hypothesis 4 was not 
supported but the moderating effect of safety climate variability was shown to be statistically 
significant across the different HLM models with or without this individualistic task factor 
and its interaction terms (i.e., individualistic task × psychological-level safety climate level, 
individualistic task × safety climate variability, & individualistic task × psychological-level 
safety climate level × safety climate variability). 
Finally, safety climate scale items with more within-workgroup variability across 
entire workgroups tend to have lower means, and they were also less predictive of safety 
behavior. These findings supported Hypothesis 5 and indicated that the safety climate scale 
items vary in terms of safety climate variability, and that item-level safety climate variability 
can serve as an important indicator of safety behavior.  
Theoretical Implications 
 The present study confirmed the proposition regarding an organizational climate 
level and variability interaction in the safety climate domain. Congruent with the previous 
organizational climate research (e.g., Colquitt et al., 2002; Dickson et al., 2006; Gonzalez-
Roma et al., 2002; Lindell & Brandt, 2000; Schneider et al., 2002), a more marked 
relationship between safety climate level and safety behavior (i.e., stronger organizational 
climate and climate outcome relationship) was detected for electrical utility workers within 
workgroups that had more consistent safety climate perceptions (smaller safety climate 
variability). This finding is the first of its kind in the safety climate research literature to the 
author’s best knowledge, and it points to the need for extending safety climate theory to 
incorporate antecedents and outcomes of safety climate variability. Thus far, most safety 
climate research has been focused on safety climate level; for example, social interaction 
among organizational members and supervisory practice/leadership as precursors, with safety 
behavior or injury rate as outcomes (e.g., Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2003; Zohar, 2010; 
SAFETY CLIMATE VARIABILITY 54 
 
 
Zohar, 2011; Zohar & Hoffmann, 2012; Zohar & Tenne-Gazit, 2008). In fact, conventional 
approaches of safety climate intervention have oftentimes been aimed at improving leader-
member communication and/or leadership style in promoting a higher level of safety climate 
(e.g., Zohar, 2002; Zohar & Polachek, in press; Zohar & Tenne-Gazit, 2008). Findings of the 
present study call for a balanced emphasis on both dimensions of safety climate: safety 
climate level and variability. As the study analyses have indicated, safety climate variability 
can be considerable even when safety climate level is generally high (see Figure 2 and Table 
2), and high safety climate level may not always be indicative of safety performance if 
variability in safety climate perceptions of organizational members is large. Therefore, 
consideration of safety climate variability can be critical to optimizing the positive impact of 
safety climate on occupational safety. Also, if some factors have a distinctive influence on 
both safety climate level and variability can be identified, this would suggest that safety 
climate level and variability need to be separately managed.  
Another important theoretical implication of the present study’s findings is the 
importance of multilevel framework for understanding safety climate. The present study 
showed that workgroup-level (aggregated) safety climate level was not a significant predictor 
of safety behavior of electrical utility workers, and that it also did not have a statistically 
significant interaction with safety climate variability. Although safety climate is an 
organizational entity according to its original definition (Zohar, 1980; 2000), it was the 
perceived and internalized psychological-level safety climate instead that impacted electrical 
utility workers’ safety behavior, such as compliance to safety policy and paying attention to 
potential hazards. The stronger impact of psychological-level safety climate level than 
workgroup-level safety climate level may be attributed to the consideration of an additional 
workgroup-level variable, safety climate variability. In fact, workgroup-level safety climate 
level showed significant correlation with safety climate variability, though the effect size was 
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not big (i.e., r = -.20, p < .01). Also, a less marked impact of workgroup-level safety climate 
level may be due to the uniqueness of the present utility/electric worker sample; who are 
known to frequently work without in-person supervision (Huang et al., 2013b). Meanwhile, 
the fact that safety climate variability, which is necessarily an above-individual-level concept
2
, 
significantly moderated the relationship between psychological-level safety climate level and 
safety behavior, indicating that the mechanism of safety climate in promotion of safety 
cannot be fully understood outside the multilevel organizational research scheme. In other 
words, even if a safety climate level and safety behavior (or outcome) relationship is 
supported, not at the above-individual-level but only at the psychological-level, the suggested 
effect of safety climate variability on this relationship, which involves a cross-level 
interaction (Aguinis et al., 2013; Cole et al., 2011), necessitates taking a multilevel 
perspective. Even though satisfactory sharedness is not ensured to create above-individual-
level safety climate (e.g., Huang et al., 2013a; Zohar, et al. 2014), safety climate variability 
always exists at the above-individual-level. Also, when safety climate variability is 
introduced to a model when testing the safety climate level and safety behavior/outcome 
relationship, a different result can be obtained compared to when safety climate variability is 
not considered. Specifically, if safety climate variability has a statistically significant 
interaction with safety climate level, the main effect term of safety climate level has a 
different meaning, because it should be interpreted in conjunction with the interaction term 
(Cox, 1984). Also, some predictors of safety behavior/outcome may no longer be statistically 
significant after controlling for safety climate variability and its interaction terms. Thus, a 
multilevel perspective would be absolutely critical to properly investigating safety climate. In 
                                           
2
 When safety climate is repeatedly measured for a person, variability may exist at an
individual-level. However, this reflects more about the person's perceptual style  
(susceptibility). With a premise that safety climate variability essentially involves mutual
influence among workgroup or organizational members, safety climate variability can 
be viewed as an above-individual-level concept. 
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the present study, measurement of safety climate level and variability was based on safety 
climate scale but responses on the scale items may be more susceptible to detecting 
psychological-level safety climate. Alternative approaches like focus group can be adopted in 
future studies to better capture (e.g., direct observation or obtaining consensus among 
members through discussion) the cross-level influences from organizations/teams to 
individuals as well as reciprocal influences among organization/tem members with respect to 
safety climate.   
The findings of the present study also indicate a need for more empirical studies 
regarding the role of safety climate variability in the promotion of occupational safety as well 
as theoretical breakthroughs. First, how safety climate variability impairs team member 
coordination when it is large can be further speculated upon. In particular, a theory of 
representational gaps which was proposed by Cronin and Weingart (2007) based on the 
shared mental model framework (Cannon-Bowers, et al., 1993; Klimoski & Mohamed, 1994; 
Stout et al., 1996) seems to be a promising way to explain this phenomenon. According to 
Cronin and Weingart, different knowledge and values of organizational members create gaps 
in their problem representations, and this in turn derails team information processing. The 
results are conflict among workers and coordination errors (i.e., actions that work against 
others’), and both can lead to poor team performance. This line of reasoning can be applied to 
safety climate research, and representational gaps would be conceptually equivalent to safety 
climate variability. Future studies need to investigate the relationship between safety climate 
variability and the numerous aspects of the quality of team member coordination in terms of 
safety performance.  
In a second line of research examining the presence of notable safety climate 
variability within a workgroup, it is possible to postulate the process of how relatively poor 
safety climate perceptions of some workers negatively affect safety climate perceptions 
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and/or safety behaviors of other workers in the same workgroup. In regard to this, the 
reciprocal safety culture model of Cooper (2000), which is an extension of the social learning 
theory of Bandura (1977) to the safety domain, could be a good starting point. It emphasizes 
the interaction between internal psychological factors and external/contextual factors. 
Specifically, one’s safety behavior is a product of contextual factors like perceptual audit 
based on safety climate perception, and an objective audit as part of a safety management 
system, with all of these factors closely interrelated. Given this reciprocal determinism, 
workers are constantly exposed to safety-related organizational cues by interacting with other 
workers. Accordingly, their safety climate perception and behavior are being continuously 
adapted. Workers with perceptions of excellent safety climate may adjust their views on their 
workplace safety practices by observing other workers with perceptions of poor safety 
climate and who behave unsafely. Similarly, workers with poor safety climate perceptions 
may modify their perceptions by observing other workers with perceptions of excellent safety 
climate who also behave safely. Future studies are required to examine whether these 
propositions are true, and which (i.e., is good safety climate influenced by poor safety climate 
or is poor safety climate influenced by good safety climate) is more common and compelling.  
Even though the main effect of safety climate variability on electrical utility workers’ 
safety behavior was not supported in the current study, a third line of research could examine 
direct, indirect, or moderating effects on numerous safety climate outcomes other than safety 
behavior; for example, job satisfaction, engagement, and turnover rate (Huang, Lee, 
McFadden, Murphy, Robertson, & Zohar, 2014) as well as productivity. This is because 
ambiguous organizational attitudes and values on safety, and subsequently large safety 
climate variability, is known to induce conflict in safety-related occupational decision making 
and cause coordination errors (Cronin & Weingart, 2007), while any conflict and 
coordination errors may become stressors for workers and impede smooth and efficient 
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workflow. Beyond the moderation effect of safety climate variability on the safety climate 
level and safety behavior/outcome relationship, the potential impact of safety climate 
variability on other psycho-behavioral outcomes needs to be investigated. Mediation 
relationships such as safety climate variability → conflict → job satisfaction and safety 
climate variability → coordination → productivity can be examined. Potential boundary 
conditions for these hypothetical relationships such as worker personality (e.g., 
agreeableness), frequency and quality of co-worker interaction, and supervisory quality are 
also worth examining. 
In a fourth line of research, theories of risk perception can be applied in safety 
climate variability research. In the present study, it was shown that workers tended to behave 
less safe, even when their safety climate level was high, if there was large safety climate 
variability in their workgroup. As risk perception is a central precursor of specific safety and 
health behavior in the paradigm of judgment and decision making (Brewer, Chapman, 
Gibbons, Gerrad, McCaul, & Weinstein, 2007; Weinstein, 1993), it can be inferred that safety 
climate variability has something to do with risk perception. One possible scenario is safety 
climate variability affects the familiarity to risky and unsafe behavior. For instance, although 
a workgroup’s safety climate level may be high in general, if workers’ safety climate 
perceptions vary notably workers are likely to observe safety-compromising behavior of 
those with relatively low safety climate perception. Continuous observation of the unsafe 
behavior might numb one’s sensitivity to the riskiness of the unsafe behavior because familiar 
risks are perceived to be less risky (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 1978; 
Slovic, Fischhoff, & Liechtenstein, 1986; Slovic, 1987). Future studies need to investigate 
whether safety climate variability is uniquely linked to increased familiarity to hazardous 
behavior as well as reduced sensitivity to the riskiness of this hazardous behavior. 
Practical Implications 
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The findings of the present study have a number of practical implications. First of all, 
safety climate variability needs to be taken into account in the management of organizational 
safety climate. Most previous studies that aimed at promoting workplace safety by improving 
safety climate have been focusing on safety climate level only (e.g., Zohar, 2002; Zohar & 
Luria, 2003; Zohar & Polachek, in press; Zohar & Tenne-Gazit, 2008). However, as it was 
shown in the current study that a higher safety climate level may not be able to induce the 
anticipated level of safety behavior if safety climate variability is large, it is clear that safety 
climate variability needs to be assessed in conjunction with safety climate level in order to 
get a more realistic estimation of workers’ safety behavior. Selection of the proper work unit 
(e.g., team, group, sector, etc.) is also important in the assessment of safety climate variability 
because it is meaningful only in particular work contexts in which workers collaborate 
closely (e.g., teamwork), work nearby each other (e.g., in the same location), and are 
psychosocially interdependent in terms of job performance (e.g., with a strong supervisor-
subordinate relationship). Also, the size of the work unit needs to be considered. If it is too 
small (e.g., two team members only), it would be more straightforward to focus on the gap(s) 
in safety climate perception between members of the same work unit than computing safety 
climate variability. If the size of work unit is too large, safety climate variability may have 
only a weak impact on individual worker’s safety behavior/performance due to the loose 
interdependence of the large number of work unit members. If a target work unit 
(organization) has for example 500 workers and safety climate variability is computed with 
these workers’ safety climate perceptions, the safety climate variability may be of little 
meaning to some workers of the same work unit because they may have virtually no chance 
to interact with the workers who contributed the most to safety climate variability (i.e., those 
having extreme safety climate perceptions).  
To address large safety climate variability, it is critical to understand what factors 
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may influence the magnitude of safety climate variability. According to Beus, Jarrett, 
Bergman, and Payne (2012), employee safety climate perceptions can be influenced by 
faultlines that are defined as “dividing lines based on the alignment of one or more group 
member attributes” (Beus et al., 2012, p. 455). This is because faultlines affect the sense-
making process (Lau & Murningham, 1998) while organizational climate perceptions emerge 
from sense-making (Ostroff, Kinicki, & Tamkins, 2003). Examples of faultlines include 
individual differences such as sex, race, tenure, functional work background, values, and 
personality as well as organizational differences such as hierarchy, management style, job 
type, and work environment. Particularly, some faultlines are more closely associated with 
workers’ safety climate perceptions as they are more relevant to safety. For instance, workers 
with different levels of knowledge and skill may have different views on the safety of their 
workplace even though they are doing the same jobs in the same immediate work 
environment. Workers who are highly skilled and have a wide range of knowledge to handle 
unexpected emergency situations are more likely to view their work environment as less risky 
even though it is full of potential hazards. Also, just enough or a less than ideal level of 
organizational safety practices can be viewed as reasonably safe to them, not because of these 
safety practices but because their personal resources to handle hazardous situations is limited. 
Within a workgroup, safety climate perceptions may differ across different types of jobs/tasks. 
Some jobs/tasks involve more safety and health risks such as overexertion, use of dangerous 
tools, handling toxic materials, and working in harsh climate conditions. Workers who are 
more frequently exposed to these sorts of work-related hazards may be less sensitive to these 
‘routinized’ hazards, and they may view poor safety climate, which is another hazard factor, 
as being relatively benign. Moreover, idiosyncratic values and attitudes of workers toward 
occupational safety can lead to heterogeneous safety climate perceptions within a workgroup. 
Workers who place stronger emphasis on occupational safety and wellbeing are more likely 
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to be sensitive to the determinants of organizational safety climate. For example, if safety 
policies and practices are present but if they are superficial at best, workers who care much 
about safety would view the safety climate of their organization as not as good as it should be, 
while workers who don’t pay as much attention to safety would perceive that the safety 
climate of their organization is good enough.  
Safety climate variability is not only attributed to different perceptual styles of 
individual workers, but also to the quality of safety supervision and leadership because safety 
climate chiefly emerges from managerial and supervisory practice (Zohar, 1980; 2010; 2011). 
If supervisors communicate only with a particular group of workers regarding safety, 
inconsistency will exist in safety management across time and situations. The delivered 
safety message is then unclear, and safety climate variability is likely to be greater among 
within-workgroup members. In regard to this possibility, Zohar and Luria (2005) showed that 
a straightforward safety message delivered to all workers and based on a simple script had a 
statistically significant beneficial impact on safety climate variability.  
As discussed so far, there can be numerous reasons for greater safety climate 
variability. Given this, a macroergonomics perspective (Hendrick & Kleiner, 2002) offers 
many practical solutions to address safety climate variability. First, a participatory 
ergonomics approach (Nagamachi, 1995; Robertson, 2000) can be applied to address the 
contributing factors of safety climate variability. Initially, interdependence of the workgroup 
members in safety performance and the potential impact of safety climate variability (e.g., 
coordination error) can be highlighted in assessment efforts. Subsequently, open discussion 
can be facilitated for the entire workgroup members to help reveal any lack of consensus 
(variability) in their safety climate perceptions, as well as why some view safety climate as 
good while others don’t. In this step, safety climate scale items that have greater variability 
than other items can serve as a useful starting point because the present study showed that 
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these higher-safety climate variability items were indeed indicative of workers’ lack of safety 
behavior. What can then follow is an open discussion regarding the unique safety concerns of 
individual workers and how they perceive their organization’s efforts to address these 
concerns to be efficient. In this way, workgroup members can develop a shared mental model 
(Cannon-Bowers, et al., 1993; Klimoski & Mohamed, 1994; Stout et al., 1996) for their 
workgroup’s safety climate, and individual worker’s safety climate perceptions can be 
adjusted to be more representative of the workgroup as a whole. This inference is in line with 
a view that organizational climate is a social–cognitive construct which arises from an active 
organizational sense-making process (Drazin, Glynn, & Kazanjian, 1999; Weick, 1995). 
Safety climate variability would be reduced once the workgroup members are able to make 
sense about the interdependence of workgroup members, individual and organizational 
differences in terms of the ability to perform safely, potential hazards in their own and 
colleagues’ work environment, and how well the workgroup’s safety is managed.  
A second practical approach can be made to improve the worker-organization interface 
(Hendrick, 2008; Hendrick & Kleiner, 2001; Hendrick & Kleiner, 2002) to meet the different 
safety expectations and needs of individual workers and reduce safety climate variability. 
Specifically, in a workgroup with large safety climate variability, workers with lower safety 
climate may be in need of more targeted safety support efforts from their organization. Also, 
they may be more aware of potential hazards in their work than others as well as the 
limitations of the existing organizational safety efforts. On the other hand, workers who 
perceive a higher safety climate might overlook their interdependence to other workers who 
perceive a lower safety climate, or they may be relatively less sensitive to the risks they may 
experience. In consideration of these sources of heterogeneous safety climate perceptions, 
multiple safety training program modules can be developed and promoted for different levels 
of work experience and types of jobs/tasks, various direct and indirect channels for reporting 
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safety concerns can be established, and participatory job design to optimize worker-work fit 
can be initiated. The primary goal of improving the worker-organization interface is to tailor 
organizational safety efforts to an individual worker’s characteristics and his/her work 
context which includes his/her workgroup. In such way, safety climate level can be advanced 
while safety climate variability can be systematically managed. More specifically, a training 
program intervention that includes participatory ergonomics to cope with individual workers’ 
needs can benefit improvement in safety climate and subsequent workplace safety, both 
which are emergent properties of work system design and process (Murphy, Robertson, & 
Carayon, 2014; Robertson, 2000; Robertson, Kleiner, & O'Neill, 2002; Robertson & Taylor, 
1996). 
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Study 
Regardless of a number of theoretical and practical implications, the present study 
has some limitations that need to be addressed in future studies to strengthen the applicability 
of the study findings. First of all, the present study is based on an electrical utility worker 
sample only, and this limits the generalizability of the study findings to different industries. 
For instance, the moderating effect of safety climate variability may be less marked in the 
transportation industry where drivers work mostly alone and interdependence among workers 
and supervisors can be relatively low (Huang et al., 2013a; Zohar, Huang, Lee, & Robertson, 
2014), whereas the impact of safety climate variability on the safety climate level and safety 
behavior relationship can be stronger for mining workers as their functional interdependence 
is essential to maintain a safe work environment (Boal, 2009; Brophy, 1964). Thus, the 
findings of the present study need to be replicated across multiple industries to ensure their 
generalizability.  
Although an employee’s company tenure as well as his/her workgroup’s company 
tenure, task independence, and individualistic task were shown to be independent from the 
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moderating effect of safety climate variability, these factors could still substantially interact 
with safety climate variability in prediction of safety behavior in other industries. Moreover, 
other potential boundary conditions that were not examined in this study can exist, leaving 
open the possibility of the presence of important boundary conditions for the moderating 
effect of safety climate variability on the relationship between safety climate level and safety 
behavior. For instance, tenure with a specific team (i.e., how long workers have been working 
with their current teams) can possibly moderate the safety climate level and safety behavior 
relationship by itself or in conjunction with safety climate variability. This is because team 
members work and interact with one another in more proximity and there is greater chance of 
mutual influence than company members. The uniqueness of the moderating effect of safety 
climate variability can be confirmed by examining the effect of potentially confounding 
variables.  
Also, in examination of Hypothesis 5, clarity of the safety climate scale items’ 
wording should have been controlled for. True item-level safety climate variability is distinct 
from perceptual noise that is caused by vague wording of safety climate scale items. If items 
can be understood in qualitatively different ways because of their unclear expressions, safety 
climate variability of these items can be overestimated and the findings of present study on 
Hypothesis 5 can be defective. Consequently, some caution is required in the interpretation 
and generalization of the Hypothesis 5 results. 
Another limitation of the present study is its cross-sectional study design. The results 
might have been different if a prospective design was used. As previous research have shown 
that safety climate can predict future safety outcomes (e.g., Beus et al., 2010; Huang et al., 
2013a; Zohar et al., 2014), the moderating effect of safety climate variability on the safety 
climate level and future safety outcomes needs to be examined in future studies.  
Additionally, instead of worker’s self-reported safety behavior, objective safety 
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outcome variables such as injury/accident frequency and severity can be used as dependent 
variables in examination of the safety climate variability’s moderation effect. If similar 
findings are obtained with these objective safety outcome variables, the practical importance 
of systematically managing safety climate variability can be further underscored.  
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Conclusion 
The present study utilized a 2,043 electrical utility worker sample to examine the 
moderation effect of safety climate variability on the safety climate level and safety behavior 
relationship. As hypothesized, safety climate level was more closely related to safety 
behavior when safety climate variability is lower. The moderating effect of safety climate 
variability was supported regardless of employee’s company tenure, workgroup’s company 
tenure, task independence, or how individualistic tasks were. Additionally, safety climate 
scale items with more variability were shown to have lower means while also being less 
predictive of worker safety behavior. These findings suggest that safety climate variability 
needs to be considered for the proper management of organizational safety climate. Although 
the contributing factors of safety climate variability need to be further investigated, the results 
of this study make it clear that improvements in the work system are required to prevent and 
address high safety climate variability.  
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Appendix A 
 
Items of the safety climate scale (from Huang, Zohar, Robertson, Garabet, Lee, & Murphy, 
2013a) 
 
item # factor  My supervisor… 
1 F1 gives me feedback about the quality of my work 
2 F1 frequently talks about safety issues throughout the work week 
3 F1 takes the time to listen to my concerns regarding safety 
4 F1 discusses ways to improve performance after non-routine or unusual job tasks 
5 F1 uses explanations (not just compliance) to get us to act safely 
6 F1 gives me positive feedback when I perform safely 
7 F2 makes sure I use all the safety equipment for the job (PPE, rubber on lines) 
8 F1 checks in with me when I am in unsafe neighborhoods 
9 F1 talks about safety but pressures us to complete work on time 
10 F3 takes the time to check on me, especially when I’m stressed or tired 
11 F1 
expects me to answer the phone or radio when he/she calls, even while I’m 
driving 
12 F3 trusts our expertise and lets us use that knowledge in the field 
13 F1 expects us to discuss the job in depth during the tailboard (pre-job brief) 
14 F2 effectively communicates my concerns to the company 
15 F1 lets me rearrange my work schedule so it makes sense to me 
16 F1 encourages a discussion among us after any major incident 
17 F1 assigns too much work for some employees, resulting in uneven work loads 
18 F3 discusses how to improve safety 
19 F2 compliments workers who pay special attention to safety 
Notes. Items # 9, 11, and 17 are reverse worded; F1 = supervisory care; F2 = participation 
encouragement; F3 = safety straight talk
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Appendix B 
 
Items of the safety behavior scale (from Huang, Zohar, Robertson, Garabet, Lee, & Murphy, 
2013a) 
 
item # 
 
1 Before starting a job I take an overview of the whole situation 
2 I always report back to my supervisor with any safety concerns 
3 I don’t like to report near misses because of the ordeal that will follow (IAs, etc.) 
4 When I am uncertain how to proceed, I ask for help 
5 I jump to get out of my truck quickly 
6 When I am rushed, I skip my pre-trip vehicle inspection 
7 I am encouraged to speak with any concerns or suggestions 
8 I follow orders without offering my own input 
9 I never walk under a ladder or raised bucket at work 
10 I never throw or toss hand tools to a co-worker on a ladder or in a raised bucket 
11 To avoid conflicts I sign off on the tailboard without raising questions 
Notes. Items # 3, 5, 6, 8, and 11 are reverse worded 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the study sample 
 
A. Workgroup size and safety climate variability 
  min max mean S.D. 
group size 3 45 11.20 9.73 
safety climate variability  .11 1.19 .57 .17 
Notes. S.D. = standard deviation; safety climate variability was measured by the standard deviation of the safety climate ratings of within-
workgroup members; correlation between group size and safety climate variability was .11 (p = .13) 
 
 
B. Frequency and % of company tenure for employees and workgroups 
  < 1 year 1-5 years 6-10 years 11-15 years >= 16 years 
employee company tenure 40 (2.0%) 381 (19.0%) 281 (14.0%) 186 (9.3%) 1,121 (55.8%) 
workgroup company tenure - 6 (3.3%) 35 (19.1%) 90 (49.2%) 52 (28.4%) 
 
 
C. Frequency and % of job types (characteristics) at Company 1 
  
Company 1  
(nemployees = 621, ngroups = 68) 
electric lines 
a
 409 (65.9%) 
substation 51 (8.2%) 
electric metering
 b
 19 (3.1%) 
meter readers 
b
 142 (22.9%) 
 
D. Frequency and % of job types (characteristics) at Company 2 
  
Company 2  
(nemployees = 1,428, ngroups = 115) 
overhead (trouble shooter)
 a
 72 (5.0%) 
overhead (line worker)
 a
 909 (63.7%) 
substation 205 (14.4%) 
underground 242 (16.9%) 
 
Notes for tables 1-C and D.
 a
 : independent task workers, 
b 
: individualistic task workers
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Table 2. Workgroup distribution by safety climate level (at workgroup-level) and variability 
(workgroup n = 183) 
 Safety climate level 
 < 0 (= mean) ≧ 0 (= mean) 
Safety climate  
variability 
≧ .57 (= mean) 47 (25.7%) 43 (23.5%) 
< .57 (= mean) 32 (17.5%) 61 (33.3%) 
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Table 3. Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) models and results for Hypothesis 1 
 
 Parameter estimates (S.E.) 
Model γ00 γ01 γ02 γ03 γ10 γ11 σ² τ00 τ11 
H1 Model 1(df = 10) 
Level 1: Safety Behaviorij = β0j + β1j×(P-SCij) + rij  
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01×(G-SCj) + γ02×(SC variabilityj)  
           + γ03×(G-SCj)×(SC variabilityj) + U0j 
Level 2: β1j = γ10 + γ11×(SC variabilityj) + U1j 
3.58  
(.05)
**
 
-.07  
(.15)
ns
 
.12  
(.08)
ns
 
.05  
(.23)
ns
 
.46  
(.08)
**
 
-.29  
(.12)
*
 
.20 .012 .012 
 
H1 Model 2(df = 9) 
Level 1: Safety Behaviorij = β0j + β1j×(P-SCij) + rij  
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01×(G-SCj) + γ02×(SC variabilityj)  
           + γ03×(G-SCj)×(SC variabilityj) + U0j 
Level 2: β1j = γ10 + γ11×(SC variabilityj) + U1j 
3.58  
(.05)
**
 
-.04  
(.04)
ns
 
.12  
(.08)
ns
 
- 
.45  
(.07)
**
 
-.28  
(.11)
*
 
.20 .012 .012 
 
H1 Model 3(df = 8) - Final model 
Level 1: Safety Behaviorij = β0j + β1j×(P-SCij) + rij  
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01×(G-SCj) + γ02×(SC variabilityj)  
           + γ03×(G-SCj)×(SC variabilityj) + U0j 
Level 2: β1j = γ10 + γ11×(SC variabilityj) + U1j 
3.58  
(.05)
**
 
- 
.13  
(.08)
ns
 
- 
.44  
(.07)
**
 
-.26  
(.11)
 *
 
.20 .012 .012 
 
H1 Model 4(df = 7) 
Level 1: Safety Behaviorij = β0j + β1j×(P-SCij) + rij  
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01×(G-SCj) + γ02×(SC variabilityj)  
           + γ03×(G-SCj)×(SC variabilityj) + U0j 
Level 2: β1j = γ10 + γ11×(SC variabilityj) + U1j 
3.57  
(.05)
**
 
- 
.14  
(.08)
ns
 
- 
.27  
(.02)
**
 
- .20 .012 .014 
Notes. Full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation was used; S.E. = standard error; P-SC = psychological-level safety climate; 
G-SC = group-level safety climate; SC = safety climate; γ00 = intercept of the model; γ01 = coefficient for G-SC; γ02 = coefficient for SC 
variability; γ03 = coefficient for G-SC and SC variability interaction term; γ10 = coefficient for P-SC; γ11 = coefficient for P-SC and SC 
variability interaction term; rij = residual; U0j = random intercept (between workgroup variance of β0j); U1j = random slope (between 
workgroup variance of β1j); σ² = var(rij); τ00 = var(U0j); τ11 = var(U1j); 
**
 p < .01;
 *
 p < .05;
 ns
 non-significant 
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Table 4. Comparison of Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) Models for Hypothesis 1 
 
 AIC BIC 
Log  
likelihood 
Deviance 
REML  
deviance 
Model comparison 
H1 Model 1 2649 2705 -1315 2629 2654 - 
H1 Model 2 2647 2698 -1315 2629 2653 H1 Model 1 vs. H1 Model 2: Δχ² = .05 (Δdf = 1, p = .83) 
H1 Model 3 2646 2691 -1315 2630 2649 H1 Model 2 vs. H1 Model 3: Δχ² = .62 (Δdf = 1, p = .43) 
H1 Model 4 2650 2689 -1318 2636 2652 H1 Model 3 vs. H1 Model 4: Δχ² = 6.09 (Δdf = 1, p < .05) 
Notes. Full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation was used; AIC = Akaike information criterion; BIC = Bayesian information 
criterion; REML = restricted maximum likelihood estimation 
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Table 5. Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) models and results for Hypothesis 2-1 
 
 Parameter estimates (S.E.) 
Model γ00 γ01 γ10 γ11 γ20 γ21 γ30 γ31 σ² τ00 τ11 τ22 τ33 
H2-1 Model 1 (df = 76) 
Level 1: Safety Behaviorij = β0j + β1j×(P-SCij)  
   + β2j×(tenureij) + β3j×(P-SCij)×(tenureij) + rij  
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01×(SC variabilityj) + U0j 
Level 2: β1j = γ10 + γ11×(SC variabilityj) + U1j 
Level 2: β2j = γ20 + γ21×(SC variabilityj) + U2j 
Level 2: β3j = γ30 + γ31×(SC variabilityj) + U3j 
3.31 
(.41)
**
 
.36 
(.71)
ns
 
.67 
(.74)
ns
 
-.22 
(1.23)
ns
 
a 
.27 
(.42)
ns 
b 
.12 
(.43)
ns 
c 
.29 
(.43)
ns 
d 
.34 
(.42)
ns
 
a 
-.34 
(.73)
ns 
b 
-.01 
(.73)
ns 
c 
-.25 
(.75)
ns 
d 
-.28 
(.72)
ns
 
a 
-.19 
(.76)
ns 
b 
-.17 
(.76)
ns 
c 
-.50 
(.76)
ns 
d 
-.24 
(.75)
ns 
a 
-.01 
(1.26)
ns 
b 
-.16 
(1.26)
ns 
c 
.21 
(1.27)
ns 
d 
-.06 
(1.24)
ns
 
.19 .004 .0003 
a 
.017 
b 
.009 
c 
.059 
d 
.004 
a 
.03 
b 
.02 
c 
.04 
d 
.02 
 
H2-1 Model 2 (df = 72) 
Level 1: Safety Behaviorij = β0j + β1j×(P-SCij)  
   + β2j×(tenureij) + β3j×(P-SCij)×(tenureij) + rij  
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01×(SC variabilityj) + U0j 
Level 2: β1j = γ10 + γ11×(SC variabilityj) + U1j 
Level 2: β2j = γ20 + γ21×(SC variabilityj) + U2j 
Level 2: β3j = γ30 + γ31×(SC variabilityj) + U3j 
3.29 
(.34)
**
 
.38 
(.57)
ns
 
.70 
(.14)
**
 
-.26 
(.11)
*
 
a 
.28 
(.35)
ns 
b 
.13 
(.35)
ns 
c 
.32 
(.36)
ns 
d 
.35 
(.34)
ns
 
a 
-.36 
(.59)
ns 
b 
-.03 
(.60)
ns 
c 
-.31 
(.62)
ns 
d 
-.31 
(.58)
ns 
a 
-.19 
(.13)
ns 
b 
-.28 
(.13)
* 
c 
-.37 
(.14)
** 
d 
-.28 
(.12)
*
 
- .19 .003 .0007 
a 
.017 
b 
.005 
c 
.053 
d 
.003 
a 
.03 
b 
.02 
c 
.04 
d 
.02 
 
H2-1 Model 3 (df = 68) - Final model 
Level 1: Safety Behaviorij = β0j + β1j×(P-SCij)   
   + β2j×(tenureij) + β3j×(P-SCij)×(tenureij) + rij  
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01×(SC variabilityj) + U0j 
Level 2: β1j = γ10 + γ11×(SC variabilityj) + U1j 
Level 2: β2j = γ20 + γ21×(SC variabilityj) + U2j 
Level 2: β3j = γ30 + γ31×(SC variabilityj) + U3j 
3.45 
(.09)
**
 
.11 
(.08)
ns
 
.70 
(.14)
**
 
-.26 
(.10)
*
 
a 
.07 
(.08)
ns 
b 
.12 
(.08)
ns 
c 
.15 
(.09)
ns 
d 
.18 
(.08)
*
 
-
 
a 
-.20 
(.13)
ns 
b 
-.28 
(.13)
* 
c 
-.37 
(.13)
** 
d 
-.28 
(.12)
*
 
- .19 .003 .0001 
a 
.017 
b 
.009 
c 
.060 
d 
.004 
a 
.03 
b 
.02 
c 
.04 
d 
.02 
Notes.  
- Full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation was used; S.E. = standard error; P-SC = psychological-level safety climate; tenure 
= employee’s company tenure at the individual level (5 response categories: 1st category = less than 1 year; 2nd category = 1-5 years, 3rd 
category = 6-10 years, 4
th
 category = 11-15 years, and 5
th
 category = 16 or more years); SC = safety climate;  
- γ00 = intercept of the model; γ01 = coefficient for SC variability; γ10 = coefficient for P-SC; γ11 = coefficient for P-SC and SC variability 
interaction term;  
- γ20 = coefficient for employee tenure; 
a
 γ20 = the effect of employee tenure on employee safety behavior for the tenure category 2 compared to 
the category 1; 
b
 γ20 = the effect of employee tenure on employee safety behavior for the tenure category 3 compared to the category 1; 
c
 γ20 
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= the effect of employee tenure on employee safety behavior for the tenure category 4 compared to the category 1; 
d
 γ20 = the effect of 
employee tenure on employee safety behavior for the tenure category 5 compared to the category 1;  
- γ21 = coefficient for employee tenure and SC variability interaction term; 
a
 γ21 = the effect of SC variability on employee safety behavior for 
the employee tenure category 2 compared to the category 1; 
b
 γ21 = the effect of SC variability on employee safety behavior for the 
employee tenure category 3 compared to the category 1; 
c
 γ21 = the effect of SC variability on employee safety behavior for the employee 
tenure category 4 compared to the category 1; 
d
 γ21 = the effect of SC variability on employee safety behavior for the employee tenure 
category 5 compared to the category 1; 
- γ30 = coefficient for P-SC and employee tenure interaction term; 
a
 γ30 = the effect of P-SC and employee tenure interaction term on employee 
safety behavior for the tenure category 2 compared to the category 1; 
b
 γ30 = the effect of P-SC and employee tenure interaction term on 
employee safety behavior for the tenure category 3 compared to the category 1; 
c
 γ30 = the effect of P-SC and employee tenure interaction 
term on employee safety behavior for the tenure category 4 compared to the category 1; 
d
 γ30 = the effect of P-SC and employee tenure 
interaction term on employee safety behavior for the tenure category 5 compared to the category 1;  
- γ31 = coefficient for P-SC, employee tenure, and SC variability interaction term; 
a
 γ31 = the effect of P-SC, employee tenure, and SC 
variability interaction term on employee safety behavior for the tenure category 2 compared to the category 1; 
b
 γ31 = the effect of P-SC, 
employee tenure, and SC variability interaction term on employee safety behavior for the tenure category 3 compared to the category 1; 
c
 
γ31 = the effect of P-SC, employee tenure, and SC variability interaction term on employee safety behavior for the tenure category 4 
compared to the category 1; 
d
 γ31 = the effect of P-SC, employee tenure, and SC variability interaction term on employee safety behavior for 
the tenure category 5 compared to the category 1;  
- rij = residual; U0j = random intercept (between workgroup variance of β0j); U1j = random slope (between workgroup variance of β1j); U2j = 
random slope (between workgroup variance of β2j); U3j = random slope (between workgroup variance of β3j); σ² = var(rij); τ00 = var(U0j); τ11 
= var(U1j); τ22 = var(U2j); τ33 = var(U3j); 
- 
**
 p < .01;
 *
 p < .05;
 ns
 non-significant
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Table 6. Comparison of Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) Models for Hypothesis 2-1 
 
 AIC BIC 
Log  
likelihood 
Deviance 
REML  
deviance 
Model comparison 
H2-1 Model 1 2666 3091 -1257 2514 2569 - 
H2-1 Model 2 2658 3062 -1257 2514 2570 H2-1 Model 1 vs. H2-1 Model 2: Δχ² = .80 (Δdf = 4, p = .93) 
H2-1 Model 3 2653 3034 -1259 2517 2569 H2-1 Model 2 vs. H2-1 Model 3: Δχ² = 2.82 (Δdf = 4, p = .89) 
Notes. Full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation was used; AIC = Akaike information criterion; BIC = Bayesian information 
criterion; REML = restricted maximum likelihood estimation 
SAFETY CLIMATE VARIABILITY 91 
 
 
Table 7. Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) models and results for Hypothesis 2-2 
 
 Parameter estimates (S.E.) 
Model γ00 γ01 γ02 γ03 γ10 γ11 γ12 γ13 σ² τ00 τ11 
H2-2 Model 1 (df = 20) 
Level 1: Safety Behaviorij = β0j + β1j×(P-SCij) + rij  
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01×(tenurej) + γ02×(SC variabilityj)  
           + γ03×(tenurej)×(SC variabilityj) + U0j 
Level 2: β1j = γ10 + γ11×(tenurej) + γ12×(SC variabilityj)  
           + γ13×(tenurej)×(SC variabilityj) + U1j 
3.66 
(.30)
**
 
a 
-.13 
(.32)
ns 
b 
-.15 
(.31)
ns 
c 
.10 
(.32)
ns
 
.10 
(.56)
ns 
a 
.04 
(.58)
ns 
b 
.13 
(.57)
ns 
c 
-.17 
(.58)
ns 
.60 
(.44)
ns 
a 
-.06 
(.46)
ns 
b 
-.18 
(.45)
ns 
c 
-.32 
(.46)
ns 
-.31 
(.74)
ns 
a 
-.16 
(.77)
ns 
b 
.06 
(.76)
ns 
c 
.36 
(.78)
ns 
.20 .010 .010 
 
H2-2 Model 2 (df = 17) 
Level 1: Safety Behaviorij = β0j + β1j×(P-SCij) + rij  
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01×(tenurej) + γ02×(SC variabilityj)  
           + γ03×(tenurej)×(SC variabilityj) + U0j 
Level 2: β1j = γ10 + γ11×(tenurej) + γ12×(SC variabilityj)  
           + γ13×(tenurej)×(SC variabilityj) + U1j 
3.64 
(.08)
**
 
a 
-.12 
(.08)
ns 
b 
-.08 
(.08)
ns 
c 
-.002 
(.08)
ns 
.13 
(.08)
ns -
 .59 
(.44)
ns 
a 
.-06 
(.46)
ns 
b 
-.18 
(.45)
ns 
c 
-.28 
(.46)
ns 
-.30 
(.73)
ns 
a 
-.17 
(.76)
ns 
b 
.05 
(.75)
ns 
c 
.31 
(.76)
ns
 
.20 .011 .009 
 
H2-2 Model 3 (df = 14) 
Level 1: Safety Behaviorij = β0j + β1j×(P-SCij) + rij  
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01×(tenurej) + γ02×(SC variabilityj)  
           + γ03×(tenurej)×(SC variabilityj) + U0j 
Level 2: β1j = γ10 + γ11×(tenurej) + γ12×(SC variabilityj)  
           + γ13×(tenurej)×(SC variabilityj) + U1j 
3.64 
(.08)
**
 
a 
-.11 
(.08)
ns 
b 
-.08 
(.08)
ns 
c 
-.004 
(.08)
ns
 
.13 
(.08)
ns
 
-
 .57 
(.11)
**
 
a 
.-18 
(.10)
ns 
b 
-.15 
(.10)
ns 
c 
-.09 
(.10)
ns 
-.26 
(.10)
* - .20 .011 .010 
 
H2-2 Model 4 (df = 11) 
Level 1: Safety Behaviorij = β0j + β1j×(P-SCij) + rij  
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01×(tenurej) + γ02×(SC variabilityj)  
           + γ03×(tenurej)×(SC variabilityj) + U0j 
Level 2: β1j = γ10 + γ11×(tenurej) + γ12×(SC variabilityj)  
           + γ13×(tenurej)×(SC variabilityj) + U1j 
3.62 
(.08)
**
 
a 
-.10 
(.08)
ns 
b 
-.06 
(.07)
ns 
c 
.01 
(.08)
ns
 
.14 
(.08)
ns
 
-
 .45 
(.07)
**
 
-
 -.28 
(.11)
** - .20 .011 .012 
 
H2-2 Model 5 (df = 8) - Final model 
Level 1: Safety Behaviorij = β0j + β1j×(P-SCij) + rij  
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01×(tenurej) + γ02×(SC variabilityj)  
           + γ03×(tenurej)×(SC variabilityj) + U0j 
Level 2: β1j = γ10 + γ11×(tenurej) + γ12×(SC variabilityj)  
           + γ13×(tenurej)×(SC variabilityj) + U1j 
3.58 
(.04)
**
 
- 
.13 
(.08)
ns
 
-
 .44 
(.07)
**
 
-
 -.26 
(.11)
* - .20 .012 .012 
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Notes.  
- Full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation was used; S.E. = standard error; P-SC = psychological-level safety climate; tenure 
= workgroup’s company tenure at the workgroup level (5 response categories: 1st category = less than 1 year; 2nd category = 1-5 years, 3rd 
category = 6-10 years, 4
th
 category = 11-15 years, and 5
th
 category = 16 or more years); SC = safety climate;  
- γ00 = intercept of the model; γ10 = coefficient for P-SC; γ12 = coefficient for P-SC and SC variability interaction term;  
- γ01 = coefficient for workgroup tenure; 
a
 γ01 = the effect of workgroup tenure on employee safety behavior for the tenure category 3 compared 
to the category 2 (c.f., For the variable workgroup company tenure, none of the workgroups fall into the 1
st
 category, indicating average 
company tenure less than 1 year. Hence, the workgroup tenure category 2 served as the reference group.); 
b
 γ01 = the effect of workgroup 
tenure on employee safety behavior for the tenure category 4 compared to the category 2; 
c
 γ01 = the effect of workgroup tenure on 
employee safety behavior for the tenure category 5 compared to the category 2;  
- γ02 = coefficient for SC variability; 
- γ03 = coefficient for workgroup tenure and SC variability interaction term; 
a
 γ03 = the effect of SC variability on employee safety behavior for 
the workgroup tenure category 3 compared to the category 2; 
b
 γ03 = the effect of SC variability on employee safety behavior for the 
workgroup tenure category 4 compared to the category 2; 
c
 γ03 = the effect of SC variability on employee safety behavior for the workgroup 
tenure category 5 compared to the category 2;  
- γ11 = coefficient for P-SC and workgroup tenure interaction term; 
a
 γ11 = the effect of P-SC and workgroup tenure interaction term on 
employee safety behavior for the tenure category 3 compared to the category 2; 
b
 γ11 = the effect of P-SC and workgroup tenure interaction 
term on employee safety behavior for the tenure category 4 compared to the category 2; 
c
 γ11 = the effect of P-SC and workgroup tenure 
interaction term on employee safety behavior for the tenure category 5 compared to the category 2;  
- γ13 = coefficient for P-SC, workgroup tenure, and SC variability interaction term; 
a
 γ13 = the effect of P-SC, workgroup tenure, and SC 
variability interaction term on employee safety behavior for the tenure category 3 compared to the category 2; 
b
 γ13 = the effect of P-SC, 
workgroup tenure, and SC variability interaction term on employee safety behavior for the tenure category 4 compared to the category 2; 
c
 
γ13 = the effect of P-SC, workgroup tenure, and SC variability interaction term on employee safety behavior for the tenure category 5 
compared to the category 2;  
- rij = residual; U0j = random intercept (between workgroup variance of β0j); U1j = random slope (between workgroup variance of β1j); σ² = 
var(rij); τ00 = var(U0j); τ11 = var(U1j); 
- 
**
 p < .01;
 *
 p < .05;
 ns
 non-significant
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Table 8. Comparison of Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) Models for Hypothesis 2-2 
 
 AIC BIC 
Log  
likelihood 
Deviance 
REML  
deviance 
Model comparison 
H2-2 Model 1 2652 2765 -1306 2612 2659 - 
H2-2 Model 2 2649 2744 -1307 2615 2659 H2-2 Model 1 vs. H2-2 Model 2: Δχ² = 2.59 (Δdf = 3, p = .46) 
H2-2 Model 3 2645 2724 -1309 2617 2661 H2-2 Model 2 vs. H2-2 Model 3: Δχ² = 2.45 (Δdf = 3, p = .48) 
H2-2 Model 4 2644 2706 -1311 2622 2654 H2-2 Model 3 vs. H2-2 Model 4: Δχ² = 4.63 (Δdf = 3, p = .20) 
H2-2 Model 5 2646 2691 -1315 2630 2649 H2-2 Model 4 vs. H2-2 Model 5: Δχ² = 7.96 (Δdf = 3, p < .05 ) 
Notes. Full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation was used; AIC = Akaike information criterion; BIC = Bayesian information 
criterion; REML = restricted maximum likelihood estimation 
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Table 9. Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) models and results for Hypothesis 3 
 
 Parameter estimates (S.E.) 
Model γ00 γ01 γ02 γ03 γ10 γ11 γ12 γ13 σ² τ00 τ11 
H3 Model 1 (df = 12) 
Level 1: Safety Behaviorij = β0j + β1j×(P-SCij) + rij  
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01×(idptj) + γ02×(SC variabilityj) 
           + γ03×(idptj)×(SC variabilityj) +U0j 
Level 2: β1j = γ10 + γ11×(idptj) + γ12×(SC variabilityj)  
           + γ13×(idptj)×(SC variabilityj) + U1j 
3.57  
(.07)
**
 
-.004  
(.09)
ns
 
.26  
(.11)
*
 
-.17  
(.15)
ns
 
.60  
(.10)
**
 
-.29  
(.14)
*
 
-.42  
(.15)
** 
.32  
(.21)
ns .20 .01 .01 
 
H3 Model 2 (df = 11) 
Level 1: Safety Behaviorij = β0j + β1j×(P-SCij) + rij  
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01×(idptj) + γ02×(SC variabilityj) 
           + γ03×(idptj)×(SC variabilityj) +U0j 
Level 2: β1j = γ10 + γ11×(idptj) + γ12×(SC variabilityj)  
           + γ13×(idptj)×(SC variabilityj) + U1j 
3.62  
(.05)
**
 
-.10  
(.03)
**
 
.17  
(.07)
*
 
- 
.59  
(.10)
**
 
-.28  
(.14)
*
 
-.41  
(.15)
** 
.31  
(.21)
ns .20 .01 .01 
 
H3 Model 3 (df = 17) - Final model 
Level 1: Safety Behaviorij = β0j + β1j×(P-SCij) + rij  
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01×(idptj) + γ02×(SC variabilityj) 
           + γ03×(idptj)×(SC variabilityj) +U0j 
Level 2: β1j = γ10 + γ11×(idptj) + γ12×(SC variabilityj)  
           + γ13×(idptj)×(SC variabilityj) + U1j 
3.63  
(.05)
**
 
-.11  
(.03)
**
 
.16  
(.07)
*
 
- 
.47  
(.07)
**
 
-.08  
(.04)
*
 
-.24  
(.10)
* -
 
.20 .01 .01 
Notes. Full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation was used; S.E. = standard error; P-SC = psychological-level safety climate; 
idpt = task independence (0 = reference group; 1 = highly independent task group); SC = safety climate; γ00 = intercept of the model; γ01 = 
coefficient for task independence; γ02 = coefficient for SC variability; γ03 = coefficient for task independence and SC variability interaction 
term; γ10 = coefficient for P-SC; γ11 = coefficient for P-SC and task independence; γ12 = coefficient for P-SC and SC variability interaction 
term; γ13 = coefficient for P-SC, task independence, and SC variability interaction term; rij = residual; U0j = random intercept (between 
workgroup variance of β0j); U1j = random slope (between workgroup variance of β1j); σ² = var(rij); τ00 = var(U0j); τ11 = var(U1j); 
- 
**
 p < .01;
 *
 p < .05;
 ns
 non-significant 
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Table 10. Comparison of Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) Models for Hypothesis 3 
 
 AIC BIC 
Log  
likelihood 
Deviance 
REML  
deviance 
Model comparison 
H3 Model 1 2633 2701 -1305 2609 2642 -  
H3 Model 2 2632 2694 -1305 2610 2641 H3-Model 1 vs. H3-Model 2: Δχ² = 1.25 (Δdf = 1, p = .26) 
H3 Model 3 2633 2689 -1306 2613 2642 H3-Model 2 vs. H3-Model 3: Δχ² = 2.84 (Δdf = 1, p = .13) 
Notes. Full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation was used; AIC = Akaike information criterion; BIC = Bayesian information 
criterion; REML = restricted maximum likelihood estimation 
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Table 11. Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) models and results for Hypothesis 4 
 
 Parameter estimates (S.E.) 
Model γ00 γ01 γ02 γ03 γ10 γ11 γ12 γ13 σ² τ00 τ11 
H4 Model 1 (df = 12) 
Level 1: Safety Behaviorij = β0j + β1j×(P-SCij) + rij  
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01×(idvlj) + γ02×(SC variabilityj) 
           + γ03×(idvlj)×(SC variabilityj) +U0j 
Level 2: β1j = γ10 + γ11×(idvlj) + γ12×(SC variabilityj)  
           + γ13×(idvlj)×(SC variabilityj) + U1j 
3.60  
(.05)
**
 
-.15  
(.13)
ns
 
.10  
(.09)
ns
 
.19  
(.21)
ns
 
.43  
(.08)
**
 
.06  
(.18)
ns
 
-.26  
(.12)
* 
-.02  
(.26)
ns .20 .01 .01 
 
H4 Model 2 (df = 11) 
Level 1: Safety Behaviorij = β0j + β1j×(P-SCij) + rij  
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01×(idvlj) + γ02×(SC variabilityj) 
           + γ03×(idvlj)×(SC variabilityj) +U0j 
Level 2: β1j = γ10 + γ11×(idvlj) + γ12×(SC variabilityj)  
           + γ13×(idvlj)×(SC variabilityj) + U1j 
3.60  
(.05)
**
 
-.15  
(.13)
ns
 
.10  
(.09)
ns
 
.20  
(.21)
ns
 
.43  
(.07)
**
 
.05  
(.06)
ns
 
-.26  
(.11)
* -
 
.20 .01 .01 
 
H4 Model 3 (df = 10) 
Level 1: Safety Behaviorij = β0j + β1j×(P-SCij) + rij  
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01×(idvlj) + γ02×(SC variabilityj) 
           + γ03×(idvlj)×(SC variabilityj) +U0j 
Level 2: β1j = γ10 + γ11×(idvlj) + γ12×(SC variabilityj)  
           + γ13×(idvlj)×(SC variabilityj) + U1j 
3.60  
(.05)
**
 
-.14  
(.13)
ns
 
.10  
(.09)
ns
 
.17  
(.20)
ns
 
.43  
(.07)
**
 
- 
-.26  
(.11)
* -
 
.20 .01 .01 
 
H4 Model 4 (df = 9) 
Level 1: Safety Behaviorij = β0j + β1j×(P-SCij) + rij  
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01×(idvlj) + γ02×(SC variabilityj) 
           + γ03×(idvlj)×(SC variabilityj) +U0j 
Level 2: β1j = γ10 + γ11×(idvlj) + γ12×(SC variabilityj)  
           + γ13×(idvlj)×(SC variabilityj) + U1j 
3.58  
(.05)
**
 
-.04  
(.05)
ns
 
.13  
(.08)
ns
 
- 
.44  
(.07)
**
 
- 
-.26  
(.11)
* -
 
.20 .01 .01 
 
H4 Model 5 (df = 8) - Final model 
Level 1: Safety Behaviorij = β0j + β1j×(P-SCij) + rij  
Level 2: β0j = γ00 + γ01×(idvlj) + γ02×(SC variabilityj) 
           + γ03×(idvlj)×(SC variabilityj) +U0j 
Level 2: β1j = γ10 + γ11×(idvlj) + γ12×(SC variabilityj)  
           + γ13×(idvlj)×(SC variabilityj) + U1j 
3.58  
(.05)
**
 
- 
.13  
(.08)
ns
 
- 
.44  
(.07)
**
 
- 
-.26  
(.11)
* -
 
.20 .01 .01 
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Notes. Full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation was used; S.E. = standard error; P-SC = psychological-level safety climate; 
idvl = individualistic task (0 = reference group; 1 = highly individualistic task group); SC = safety climate; γ00 = intercept of the model; γ01 = 
coefficient for individualistic task; γ02 = coefficient for SC variability; γ03 = coefficient for individualistic task and SC variability interaction 
term; γ10 = coefficient for P-SC; γ11 = coefficient for P-SC and individualistic task; γ12 = coefficient for P-SC and SC variability interaction 
term; γ13 = coefficient for P-SC, individualistic task, and SC variability interaction term; rij = residual; U0j = random intercept (between 
workgroup variance of β0j); U1j = random slope (between workgroup variance of β1j); σ² = var(rij); τ00 = var(U0j); τ11 = var(U1j); 
- 
**
 p < .01;
 *
 p < .05;
 ns
 non-significant 
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Table 12. Comparison of Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) Models for Hypothesis 4 
 
 AIC BIC 
Log  
likelihood 
Deviance 
REML  
deviance 
Model comparison 
H4-Model 1 2652 2719 -1314 2628 2657 -  
H4-Model 2 2650 2711 -1314 2628 2656 H4-Model 1 vs. H4-Model 2: Δχ² = .007 (Δdf = 1, p = .93) 
H4-Model 3 2648 2704 -1314 2628 2653 H4-Model 2 vs. H4-Model 3: Δχ² = .63 (Δdf = 1, p = .43) 
H4-Model 4 2647 2698 -1314 2629 2652 H4-Model 3 vs. H4-Model 4: Δχ² = .71 (Δdf = 1, p = .40) 
H4-Model 5 2646 2691 -1315 2630 2649 H4-Model 4 vs. H4-Model 5: Δχ² = .90 (Δdf = 1, p = .34) 
Notes. Full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation was used; AIC = Akaike information criterion; BIC = Bayesian information 
criterion; REML = restricted maximum likelihood estimation
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Table 13. Results for Hypothesis 5 
 
item # 
a
item-level 
 mean 
b
item-level  
SC variability 
mean 
c
mean of item-level 
variance  
below workgroup mean 
d
mean of item-level 
variance 
above workgroup mean 
e
r between  
item rating  
& SB 
1 3.28 .99 1.72 .91 .23 
2 3.56 .89 1.65 .92 .24 
3 3.63 .92 2.07 .85 .26 
4 3.17 .90 1.39 .97 .23 
5 3.32 .92 1.48 .87 .25 
6 3.27 1.01 1.77 1.07 .23 
7 4.09 .75 1.36 .72 .27 
8 2.54 .91 1.33 1.08 .19 
9 2.75 1.01 1.33 1.35 .15 
10 2.67 .96 1.49 1.11 .18 
11 3.20 1.04 1.69 1.30 .25 
12 3.62 .99 2.22 .98 .25 
13 4.18 .69 1.69 .65 .29 
14 2.85 .94 1.79 1.05 .23 
15 2.94 1.04 2.07 1.15 .14 
16 3.91 .90 3.89 1.32 .26 
17 2.78 .97 2.77 1.36 .20 
18 3.71 .79 3.71 1.67 .28 
19 3.32 .97 3.36 1.75 .25 
Notes. SC = safety climate; SB = safety behavior; r = correlation; for all of the 19 items, 
correlation between item mean and safety behavior was statistically significant (p < .01) 
- aitem-level mean = mean of ratings on a particular item across all respondents 
- bitem-level SC variability mean = mean of within-workgroup standard deviation on a 
particular item across all workgroups  
- cmean of variance below workgroup mean = mean of (item rating – workgroup item mean)2 
across workgroups only for the (item rating – workgroup item mean) values that are below 
zero 
- dmean of variance above workgroup mean = mean of (item rating – workgroup item mean)2 
across workgroups only for the (item rating – workgroup item mean) values that are above 
zero 
- er between item rating & SB = correlation coefficient between safety climate scale item 
rating and participant safety behavior (all r coefficients were statistically significant at p 
< .01) 
- r between a and b = -.67 (p < .01) 
- ρ between a and e = .91 (p < .01) 
- ρ between b and e = -.62 (p < .01) 
- ρ between c and e = .32 (p = .19) 
- ρ between d and e = -.29 (p = .23)
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Figure 1. Graphical illustration of the study hypotheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-A. Hypothesis 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-B. Hypotheses 2-4 
 
 
Notes. Safety climate variability and its moderation effect were described in dotted lines 
because introduction of tenure or task characteristics to the original moderation model 
(Figure 1-A) may result in non-significant moderation effect of safety climate variability 
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Safety Climate 
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Behavior 
Safety Climate 
Variability 
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Safety Climate 
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Behavior 
Safety Climate 
Variability 
H2-1: Employee tenure 
H2-2: Workgroup tenure 
H3: Task independence 
H4: Individualistic task 
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Figure 2. Safety climate level (at workgroup-level) and variability relationship 
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Notes. Data point = workgroup (n = 183); Safety climate level: workgroup-level (aggregated) 
and grand mean centered where 0 means overall mean across the 183 workgroups; Safety 
climate variability: standard deviation of within-workgroup members’ safety climate 
perception; Extrapolation line shown in the figure indicates a linear relationship between the 
safety climate level and variability (r = -.20, p < .01). 
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Figure 3. Safety climate level (at psychological-level) and variability relationship across 183 
work groups 
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Notes. Data point = individual employee (n = 2,049); Safety climate level is at the 
psychological-level (not aggregated); Safety climate variability: standard deviation 
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Figure 4. Graphical illustration of Hypothesis 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. Level 1 = individual (psychological) level; Level 2 = workgroup level
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Figure 5. Safety climate level (at psychological-level) and safety behavior relationship for the 
high and low safety climate variability conditions 
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Notes. SC = safety climate; High SC variability = 1 standard deviation above the mean 
workgroup safety climate variability, indicating ‘low consensus’ in safety climate perceptions 
among workgroup members; Low SC variability = 1 standard deviation below the mean 
workgroup safety climate variability indicating ‘high consensus’ in safety climate perceptions 
among workgroup members. 
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Figure 6. Graphical illustration of Hypotheses 2-1 and 2-2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-A. Graphical illustration of Hypothesis 2-1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6-B. Graphical illustration of Hypothesis 2-2 
 
Notes. Level 1 = individual (psychological)-level; Level 2 = workgroup-level; Employee 
tenure = employee’s company tenure; Workgroup tenure = workgroup’s company tenure 
(computed by averaging within-workgroup employees’ company tenure) 
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Figure 7. Graphical illustration of Hypothesis 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. Level 1 = individual (psychological)-level; Level 2 = workgroup-level 
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Figure 8. Graphical illustration of Hypothesis 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes. Level 1 = individual (psychological)-level; Level 2 = workgroup-level 
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